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Introduction – The influence of the Dutch on the development of Nagasaki during 
the second half of the nineteenth century. 
 “Nagasaki was where it all took place, and the exotic centre to which one could come to see 
foreigners, Dutch and Chinese, albeit at a distance.”.1 These are the words of the historian 
Marius B. Jansen as he describes the uniqueness of Nagasaki throughout the Edo-period2 (1603 
– 1868) of Japan. This extraordinary position that Nagasaki had was mostly due to the special 
position it fulfilled in the (international) trade system of Japan during the Edo-period. It was in 
this city that two special foreign enclaves were situated; the fan-shaped island of Deshima, 
from which the Dutch conducted their trade with Japan, and the square-shaped walled 
compound not far from there, which hosted the Chinese trading quarter (Tōjin yashiki,  唐人屋
敷3). It was these two enclaves in Nagasaki that were responsible for the majority of the contact 
with the outside world in Japan during this era. Nagasaki was one of the few locations in Japan 
where foreign trade was allowed (the other locations being the island Tsushima between Japan 
and Korea, the Ryukyu Islands and the Matsumae domain on Hokkaido). On top of that, it was 
the only city in the whole of Japan where trade with Europeans took place.4  
  Yet when reading about the situation of Nagasaki at the start of the Meiji era (1868 - 
1912) one can barely recognize this prestigious port city anymore. The numerous changes that 
the opening of Japan and the subsequent Meiji Restoration5 brought hit Nagasaki hard. By the 
1870s Nagasaki had lost but all of its prestige and seemed to become just one of many other 
cities in Japan, as foreign merchants and capital steadily left the city because of a gradually 
 
1 M. B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (2002) 64. 
2 The Edo-period also known as the Tokugawa-period was the period between 1603 and 1868. The period was 
named after the ruling Tokugawa-clan who took control in 1600. The period was characterized by increasing 
seclusion policies and by over two centuries of relative peace and prosperity. The last part of this period was 
known as the Bakumatsu-period (1853 – 1868, Jp  幕末). This last period saw the end of the isolationist policies of 
the preceding centuries and marked the beginning of major reforms in Japan.  
3 This thesis will add Japanese characters to Japanese names of concepts that can be translated like as example the 
Chinese trading quarter. Names of characters and places will not have Japanese characters added to them.   
4 Ibid, 63 - 64. 
5 The Meiji Restoration (Jp. 明治維新) was an event in 1868 that marked the end of the military dictatorship in 
Japan and restored power to the Emperor. The period after 1868 is also known as the Meiji Era (1868 – 1912) and 
was characterized by many political and social reforms that had begun in the preceding Bakumatsu-period. 
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worsening foreign trade situation.6 This loss of its historical position also becomes abundantly 
clear from a news article written in the Nagasaki Press in April 1870. The article describes:  
“It is painful to note the swift and sure decay of foreign trade at Nagasaki. As firm after firm 
finds it advisable to withdraw its capital from the port, as resident after resident finds the utter 
stagnation of trade rendering his labour unnecessary, as day after day business seems to grow 
worse instead of better, the end becomes more and more certain to our unwilling sense. We 
struggle against the thought that our power is no more in Nagasaki, we try to fancy that a 
better time is coming, but as no signs of that better time show themselves, we cannot help 
anticipating the final result.”7 
  The decline of the prestigious, bustling port city was a relatively swift one, but it does 
not mean that there were no attempts made to keep Nagasaki one of the most prominent cities 
in Japan. Early 2019, the University Library of Leiden acquired a collection of documents that 
show a very different Nagasaki. The newly acquired collection of University Library concerns the 
‘Hideshima Archive’ of the Nabeshima-clan8 (rulers of the Saga domain, situated north of 
Nagasaki), one of the few clans which were tasked with the defence of Nagasaki during the Edo-
period. The archive contains a wide array of detailed military lessons, maps of Nagasaki and 
other sensitive materials regarding national defence that they seemingly based on Dutch 
knowledge that they acquired in Nagasaki. As a result, many of these documents feature the 
attempted modernization efforts in Nagasaki (and its surroundings) in the decade after 1853 to 
keep Nagasaki on par with other cities in Japan. Looking at these documents you see a Nagasaki 
bay bustling with foreign ships, the development of coastal defences and Western-style training 
exercises for armies (and navy) that occurred there. While these documents are mostly 
militaristic in nature, they are very much connected to the wider modernization developments 
in other sectors. The first decade after the opening of Japan still seems to have been a 
prosperous time for Nagasaki.  
 
6 L. Earns, ‘The Foreign Settlement in Nagasaki, 1859-1869’, Historian 56:3, (1994) 499. 
7 The Nagasaki Press, 16 April 1870, 2 in: L. Earns, ‘The Foreign Settlement in Nagasaki, 1859-1869’, Historian 56:3, 
(1994) 499.  
8 Leiden University Library Special Collections, Hideshima Archive of the Nabeshima han 1854 - 1863, Or. 27.750, 
Shelf 22.513 F (Leiden, the Netherlands) 
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  Now the question one would ask is how a city, which seemingly had everything going in 
its favour, started to disappear so quickly from the stage. The most obvious answer here would 
relate to the events of the 8th of July 1853, the day Commodore Matthew Perry (1794 – 1858) 
approached Japan with his American gunboats. When Commodore Perry forced the Japanese 
to open negotiations with him, he staunchly refused to do so through Nagasaki, thus 
undermining the position the city had as the ‘window to the West’.9 He also forced negotiations 
to open the other ports of Japan, so that the Western countries were no longer confined to the 
boundaries of Nagasaki.10  The year of 1853-1854 is not without reason regarded as a major 
turning point in Japanese history. The opening of the ports set a new course for Japan, one with 
more Western influences and one that would also see the rise of the imperialistic Japan of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
  But as with many things, the answer here is not that straightforward. The arrival of 
Commodore Perry was not the first attempt to break the status quo in Japan’s contact with the 
West. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century a few countries had been eyeing the Dutch 
presence in Nagasaki with envy. Primarily these were the United Kingdom, Russia and the 
United States of America. During the period of opperhoofd11 Hendrik Doeff (1777 – 1835, on 
Deshima between 1803 – 1817), while the Netherlands and most of its colonies were occupied 
by either the French or the English, there were multiple attempts undertaken to break the 
monopoly of the Dutch in Japan.12 The most famous of these incidents was the so-called 
‘Phaeton incident’ of 1808 in which a British frigate tried to sail into the harbour of Nagasaki 
under a stolen Dutch flag in an attempt to ambush Dutch trading. Even though the Phaeton 
failed in ambushing the ships, as the Dutch ships were late that year, the incident scared the 
Japanese enough to revise their seclusion policies and also prepare for similar incidents in the 
 
9 W. McOmie, The Opening of Japan 1853-1855: A comparative study of the American, British, Dutch and Russian 
naval expeditions to compel the Tokugawa shogunate to conclude treaties and open ports to their ships 
(Folkestone 2006) 90 – 105. 
10 Ibid. 261 – 275. 
11 Opperhoofd (chief) was the title given to the individuals that led the outposts of Deshima until 1860. After 1860 
the title was replaced by only the title “Dutch Commissioner in Japan” for the highest Dutch official in Japan.  
12 W.A. Veenhoven, Strijd om Deshima, Een onderzoek naar de aanslagen van Amerikaanse, Engelse en Russische 
zijde op het Nederlandse handelsmonopolie in Japan gedurende de periode 1800 – 1817 (Leiden 1950) 9. 
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future.13  These attempts to break the monopoly of the Dutch in Nagasaki can be seen as the 
prelude of the opening of Japan by Commodore Perry. These attempts continued irregularly 
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, but it was not Japan who eventually had its 
ports opened by ‘gunboat diplomacy’ first. 
  Since 1757 Westerners were also no longer able to freely call at port cities in China, 
similar to the situation in Japan. Canton was the only city in China where Westerners were 
allowed to conduct their trade thanks to seclusion regulations imposed by the Qing dynasty.14 
This all changed with the eruption of the First Opium War (1840 – 1842) in which China was 
forced to open its ports to Western trade. By the end of the First Opium War England had come 
out as the main power in East Asian trade.15 The unfolding of events in China greatly interested 
but also scared both the Japanese and the Dutch governments. The balance of power in the 
region was shifting and the old traditional order in Japan (with foreign trade limited to small 
enclaves) was increasingly threatened. The attitude of the Dutch towards their trade in Japan 
also changed because of the First Opium War. During the 1840’s the small island of Deshima in 
Nagasaki transformed from a trading post to a (pre-)diplomatic post through which the Dutch 
hoped to gain an advantageous position in Japan before the other nations (like the UK and the 
USA) would arrive.16 An example of this change in attitude is the letter that King William II of 
the Netherlands (1792 - 1849) sent in 1844. In the letter the king warns the shogun17 that it was 
in everyone’s best interest if Japan would open its ports, on its own terms, before it would be 
done for them. Simultaneously the king requested that official diplomatic channels with the 
Netherlands would be opened, something that was unthinkable in the two-hundred years prior. 
Even though the shogun cordially dismissed the warning, it must have cautioned him for what 
 
13 N. Wilson, ‘Tokugawa Defense Redux: Organizational Failure in the Phaeton Incident of 1808’, The Journal of 
Japanese Studies 36:1 (2010) 1 – 6. 
14 H. Masashi, ‘Canton and Nagasaki Compared in the Context of Global and World History’, Itenario 37:3 (2013) 7 
– 8. 
15 Ibid, 7 - 10. 
16 M.P.H. Roessingh, The Archive of the Dutch Factory in Japan 1609 – 1860 (‘s Gravenhage 1964) X.  
17 The shogun (Jp. 将軍) was the military ruler of Japan who together with his government, the bakufu (Jp. 幕府), 
ruled Japan for almost 700 year. The Tokugawa clan was the controller of the title shogun and the bakufu during 
the Edo-period (or Tokugawa period) from 1600 – 1868, until the Meiji Restoration restored power to the emperor 
of Japan.   
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might come to pass.18 For the Dutch it became important (from a trade and prestige 
perspective) that when Japan would open its ports, they would be able to leave their mark on 
this new era for Japan.19  
  Yet when looking at the available literature it seems as if the Dutch just vanished post-
1853. Just by looking at the titles of books that explore Japanese-Dutch relations this notion 
becomes clear. Books like Grant K. Goodman’s The Dutch Impact on Japan (1640 – 1853)20 and 
Japan and the Dutch (1600 – 1853)21, Els M. Jacobs’ The redhaired in Japan: Dutch influence on 
Japanese cartography (1640 – 1853)22 and H. Paul’s Nederlanders in Japan, 1600 – 1854: De 
VOC op Deshima23, to name a few, all incorporate 1853/54 as the year the Dutch influence in 
Japan started to wane (if not disappeared altogether). And while this thesis will not argue that 
the events that occurred in 1853/1854 greatly dictated the decrease of Dutch influence on 
Japan in the years after that, it will argue that the various actions of the Dutch still had a 
profound influence on various branches of Japanese society in the decades after 1853 
(especially in Nagasaki). Simultaneously can these various attempts and actions by the Dutch be 
framed in a wider picture of decline, both of Dutch influence in Japan as the role of the Dutch 
on the world stage. While these actions were of considerable worth to Japan’s initial 
modernization efforts, they can also be viewed as (failed) attempts by the Dutch to keep their 
old place in a world that was passing them by.  
   Recent years saw some increase in research into the Dutch influence on various parts of 
Japanese society post-1853. In National Prestige and Economic Interests Minori Kogure argues 
that the Dutch definitely had their own ambitions and interests in securing proper diplomatic 
relations with Japan even after 1850, long after their position as a maritime (super)power had 
waned, as they were looking to expand into new markets and retain their old position. They 
wanted to expand into new markets thanks to the so-called ‘cultuurstelsel’ (‘cultivation system’, 
 
18 Nationaal Archief The Hague, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, 1609 – 1860, arch. nr. 1.04.21/inv. nr. 1707 – 1716, 
Antwoord van de shogun T. Ieyoshi de waarschuwing/Reply of the shogun T. Ieyoshi to a warning (1844). 
19 E.M. Jacobs, ‘Met alleen woorden als wapen. De Nederlandse poging tot openstelling van Japanse havens voor 
de internationale handel (1844)’, BGMN: Low Countries Historical Review 105:1 (1990) 75 – 77.  
20 G. K. Goodman, The Dutch Impact on Japan (1640 – 1853) (Leiden 1967). 
21 G. K. Goodman, Japan and the Dutch (1600 – 1853) (Richmond 2000). 
22 E. M. Jacobs, The redhaired in Japan: Dutch influence on Japanese cartography (Vancouver 1983).  
23 H. Paul, Nederlanders in Japan, 1600 – 1854: De VOC op Deshima (Weesp 1984).  
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implemented in 1830), a system where farmers in the East Indies were forced to allot parts of 
their fields to export crops for Dutch colonial trade. This work by Kogure examines what the 
Dutch tried to achieve diplomatically in Japan following its opening and also argues that 
prestige was an important factor to the actions of the Dutch but rarely goes into how these 
achievements connected with other developments in Japan.24  
  Similarly, Monopolists to Middlemen by Martha Chaiklin also examines Dutch diplomacy, 
but Chaiklin focusses on the diplomatic successes the Dutch had in the negotiations between 
Japan and other Western countries. Chaiklin also argues in her work that the Dutch are often, 
unjustly, seen as irrelevant in the opening of Japan and subsequent years, while all the credit 
goes to the Americans and their (gunboat) diplomacy.25 In her work, she argues that the Dutch 
were vital to the diplomatic ventures of various countries in Bakumatsu era Japan and that the 
Dutch networks and knowledge played an important role for various developments in those 
years. Without the efforts of the Dutch, the treaties that the Americans and other countries 
concluded might not have been possible and Dutch liberalism lingered in diplomacy with Japan 
in the years to come. Yet, also this work never ties this influence with actual developments in 
Japan at that time, but instead stays on a higher (mainly diplomatic) level.26 
  Another aspect that is an area of attention for researchers is rangaku (Jp. 蘭学, meaning 
‘Dutch learning’). Rangaku was an important branch of science in Japan and focused on 
studying various parts of Western science (mostly medicine, language, botany and physics) to 
possibly adapt them for the Japanese society. To study Western sciences scholars were 
completely dependent on the books and objects that the Dutch would bring with them. The 
development of such educational (medical) networks in Edo-period Japan is the subject of 
works like ‘Surgery by the Red-haired Barbarians’; Dutch Physicians in Japan, 1600 – 1870’ by 
J.E. Veldman27 and Network of Knowledge by Terrence Jackson.28 Both works are examples of 
 
24 M. Kogure, National Prestige and Economic Interest: Dutch Diplomacy toward Japan 1850 – 1863 (Maastricht 
2008). 
25 M. Chaiklin, ‘Monopolists to Middlemen: Dutch Liberalism and American Imperialism in the Opening of Japan’, 
Journal of World History 21:2 (2010) 263 – 269.    
26  Ibid. 249 – 269.    
27 Veldman, J E. "'Surgery by the Red-haired Barbarians'; Dutch Physicians in Japan, 1600-1870." Nederlands 
Tijdschrift Voor Geneeskunde 145:52 (2001) 2542-2547 
28 T. Jackson, Network of Knowledge: Western Science and the Tokugawa information revolution (Honolulu 2016).    
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research into the role of Rangaku in Edo-period Japan and which role it played in the shaping of 
science in that era. Veldman gives in “Surgery by the Red-haired Barbarians” a summary of the 
complete history of Dutch medical teachings in Japan from 1600 till 1870 in only a few pages. 
Veldman also states that the Dutch were fundamental not only for founding the first medical 
hospitals in Nagasaki, Tokyo and Osaka but even credits them with establishing the basis for all 
Western medicine in Japan.29 While the first medical school/hospital in Japan which was 
founded by the Dutch is very interesting and, rightfully so, gets a lot of attention, it will not be 
included in this thesis. This because the medical school was no defining institution in Nagasaki 
becoming a military-industrial centre. 
  Jackson’s Network of Knowledge describes the influence of Rangaku in Japan through 
the life of one specific scholar; Ōtsuki Gentaku (1757 – 1827). In this work, Jackson describes 
the Dutch influence on his life and works. By using this specific scholar he shows the reader that 
this influence was widespread among Rangaku scholars during the Edo-period, but he also 
summarizes shortly how this influence continued into the Meiji era in the final chapters of his 
work.30 Works like these are the newest addition to similar research into this subject like 
Marius B. Jansen’s ‘Rangaku and Westernization’31 and Sumio Ishida’s ‘The age of “Rangaku”32 
of the 1980s. While these studies are vital to understanding how Western knowledge was 
processed in Japan, these studies rarely discuss how Dutch knowledge influenced development 
in Bakumatsu era Japan and mostly focus on the period before 1853. Other researches that 
cover the activities and influence of the Dutch during the Bakumatsu era (and later) are also 
often conducted on microlevels, focusing on individuals and their actions. Examples of these 
are Een Miskend Geneesheer: Dr. J.K. Van Den Broek En De Overdracht Van Kennis Van 
Westerse Technologie in Japan, 1853-1857 by Herman J. Moeshart33, which focuses on one of 
the Dutch doctors which went to Japan to train local doctors, and Four Dutch Pharmacists in 
 
29 Veldman, “Surgery by the Red-haired Barbarians’, 2545 – 2547. 
30 T. Jackson, Network of Knowledge, 165 – 188. 
31 M.B. Jansen, ‘ Rangaku and Westernization’, Modern Asian Studies 18:4 (1984) 541 – 553.  
32 S. Ishida, ‘The age of “Rangaku” (Dutch learning): Medical education in 19th century Japan’, History of medical 
education : proceedings of the 6th international symposium on the comparative history of medicine-East and West 
(1981) 151-179. 
33 H.J. Moesthart, Een Miskend Geneesheer: Dr. J.K. Van Den Broek En De Overdracht Van Kennis Van Westerse 
Technologie in Japan, 1853 – 1857 (Amsterdam 2003). 
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Japan, 1869 – 1885 by J.W. Verburgt34. M. Taniguchi & Z. Bowers’ ‘Pompe van Meerdervoort 
and the First Western Medical School in Japan’35 similarly covers Dutch influence in the medical 
sector in Nagasaki through the perspective of another Dutch individual in Japan.  
  These three publications are examples of the Rangaku/Dutch influence on medicine in 
Japan during the Bakumatsu, but there are also publications of microlevel on other aspects of 
development in Japan like J. Stellingwerf’s Zijne Majesteits radarstoomschip Soembing 
overgedragen aan Japan36 (‘His Majesty’s paddle steamer Soembing, transferred to Japan’). 
Stellingwerf uses admiral G. Fabius diary to narrate the story of the transfer of a Dutch warship 
(the Soembing, later renamed the Kankō maru) to Japan as part of diplomatic exchanges and 
how Fabius experienced Dutch influence in Nagasaki. Stellingwerf’s work is an example of 
Dutch influence in the military-industrial field and the first Western naval school in Japan. While 
such microlevel style publications are important to understand the day-to-day actions and the 
details of Dutch influence in Japan, they rarely tie these individual stories to greater 
developments occurring at that time. On a more metalevel, publications like Mark Ravina’s To 
Stand with the Nations of the World (that encompasses Japan’s efforts to modernize in the 
second half of the nineteenth century), often completely skip past the influence of the Dutch 
during the Bakumatsu era. Instead he gives most of the credit of Japan’s Westernisation 
developments to Americans, English and French attempts from the mid-1860s and onwards.37  
  By tying these micro-level stories to the developments on a larger scale, like those in 
Nagasaki during the Bakumatsu and later, we can learn more about how these actions of 
individuals influenced larger developments at play in post-1853 Japan (and vice versa). The 
central question this thesis will thus attempt to answer is: ‘To what extent did the Dutch 
influence shape the development of Nagasaki after the opening of Japan in 1854?’. To narrate 
the development of Nagasaki three sectors of Nagasaki will be examined; the military sector, 
 
34 J.W. Verburgt, Four Dutch Pharmacists in Japan, 1869 – 1885 (s.l. 1991).  
35 M. Taniguchi and Z. Bowers, ‘Pompe van Meerdervoort and the First Western Medical School in Japan’, Journal 
of Medical Education 40 (1965) 448 – 454. 
36 J. Stellingwerf and G. Fabius, Zijne Majesteits radarstoomschip Soembing overgedragen aan Japan: De drie 
diplomatieke reizen van G. Fabius ter opening van Deshima en Nagasaki in 1854, 1855 en 1856 (Zutphen 1988).  
37 M. Ravina, To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan’s Meiji Revolution in World History (Oxford 2017) 97 – 
120.  
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the (rising) industrial sector and the (declining) trade sector in Nagasaki. The end date of this 
paper will be 1900 because this time span gives us the opportunity to examine the remaining 
Dutch influences in the three aforementioned sectors until these influences almost completely 
disappear by the year 1900.  
  To show the developments in Nagasaki, this research will use the methodology of David 
Palmer’s ‘Nagasaki’s Districts’38. Palmer uses a social-geographic approach in his article to 
narrate the interaction between the contact with the West and the development of Nagasaki 
from its earliest foundations until the destruction by the atomic bomb in 1945. In his 
publication he examines the developments per sector/neighbourhood in Nagasaki and how 
these are influenced by contact with the ‘West’ that took place in the city. Palmer shows with 
his approach how linking Western influences on a social/political level influenced the growth of 
various neighbourhoods in Nagasaki.39 This paper will have a similar social-
geographical/geopolitical approach but in a different scope and timeframe. This paper will 
instead explore the developments made in three main sectors of Nagasaki in the nineteenth 
century. As a result the following three sub-questions have been formulated. The first question 
is:  ‘How did the Dutch presence in Japan influence the developments in the military sector of 
Nagasaki in the nineteenth century?’. The second sub-question this thesis will answer is: ‘How 
did the Dutch presence in Japan influence the developments in the industrial sector of Nagasaki 
in the nineteenth century?’. The final sub-question of this thesis will be: ‘How did the Dutch 
presence in Japan influence the developments in the trade sector of Nagasaki in the nineteenth 
century?’. The efforts of the Dutch in Nagasaki will also be examined in conjunction with the 
changing position of the Dutch in the world. This way a broader narrative will be created where 
research of individual topics like industrialization, militarism and trade in Nagasaki will be 
compared parallel to each other and how these are influenced by greater developments in 
Japan and the world.      
   As mentioned before, the first aspect (and chapter) of this thesis will focus on military 
developments in and around Nagasaki. Modernizing its military to protect the country became 
 
38 D. Palmer, ‘Nagasaki’s Districts: Western Contact with Japan through the History of a City’s Space’,  Journal of 
Urban History 42:3 (2016) 477 – 505.  
39 Idem, 477 – 482. 
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one of the prime issues Japan faced after 1853. To achieve this Japan initially turned to its 
longstanding relations with the Dutch in Nagasaki. Through these interactions with the Dutch, 
the foundation was laid for a modern navy and shaped new coastal defence policies. The 
second chapter will focus on the rise of the (military-)industrial aspects of Nagasaki. To produce 
the supplies for its new military a powerful industrial workforce was vital. Nagasaki and its 
surroundings are where many of the first industrial developments took place, many of them 
through interactions with the Dutch. The final aspect and chapter of this thesis will focus on 
how Nagasaki developed from a bustling city revolving around foreign trade at the start of the 
1850s to an increasingly (military)-industrial complex. This change is the one that the citizens of 
Nagasaki likely felt the most as they had to adapt to the new economic situation in the city that 
had arisen by the late 1870s. This change in nature of the city was also tied to greater 
developments happening in Japan and were also influenced by the Dutch. The Dutch, especially 
through the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM)40, had to carefully manoeuvre to 
protect their own assets while taking advantage of the new open Japanese market.  
 Many of the works that were described above will play an important role in analysing 
and narrating the shifting situation in Nagasaki during the nineteenth century and to correlate 
the various developments during that era. To further supplement the selected literature for this 
thesis, various sources will be used to help analyse the described changes through more 
contemporary perspectives. Contemporary Dutch sources will play an important role in 
supplying necessary details because they offer a wide selection of Dutch perspectives. Examples 
of these are sources of the Dutch government, like files from the Dutch consulate in Nagasaki 
and Yokohama, and documents from the NHM. The dissertation Neêrlands streven tot 
openstelling van Japan voor den wereldhandel from J.A. van der Chijs (1867)41, which includes 
many unpublished Dutch sources, will be used at times throughout this thesis. This dissertation 
was also widely used as reference material for the Dutch government back then because the 
Dutch were still very much involved in Japan at that time. These sources will be used in 
conjunction with more personal narratives. Examples of these are the narratives of Janus 
 
40 The NHM was a large private Dutch company which mainly focused on Dutch interests in East-Asia. It is often 
regarded as the spiritual successor of the VOC and had close ties with the Dutch government.  
41 J.A. van der Chijs, Neêrlands streven tot openstelling van Japan voor den wereldhandel (Amsterdam 1867). 
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Henricus Donker Curtius42 (the last opperhoofd of Deshima from 1852 – 1855, and first Dutch 
Commissioner in Japan till 1860), Dirk de Graeff van Polsbroek43 (a diplomat sent by the Dutch 
government who was in Japan from 1857 till 1870), Philipp Franz von Siebold (1823 - 1829 and 
1859 - 1862 in Japan and avid researcher of Japan)44 and Admiral Gerhardus Fabius (who made 
diplomatic trips to Nagasaki in 1853, 1854 and 1855)45.  
  The reason that Dutch sources will have a prominent position is because of their sheer 
availability and accessibility. But where possible other nation’s sources will also be used, like 
Commodore Perry’s personal journal46. Also the account of Thomas Blake Glover (1838 – 1911. 
Also known as ‘the Scottish Samurai’, 1859 – 1911 in Japan), who lived and traded in Nagasaki 
for a big part of his life and worked closely with the NHM, will be used in this thesis.47 Due to a 
language barrier will Japanese sources not be included in this paper unless translated. 
Regretfully, because of this will all the Japanese perspectives in this paper be completely based 
on contemporary literature. If Japanese sources would have been accessible they could have 
been used to examine the Japanese impression of Dutch influences in Nagasaki post-1853, as a 
counterweight to (possibly exaggerated) views of Dutch activities in Dutch source materials. 
These non-Dutch works of literature will nonetheless give us a degree of different perspectives 
and complement the Dutch source materials, even if they are not contemporary primary 
sources. Besides the written sources, Japanese visual sources will also be used at times in this 
thesis. Maps and other visual materials, like paintings and drawings, will be used to visualize the 
changes in Nagasaki’s landscape. Especially when it comes to the growth of the industry in 
Nagasaki the sheer amount of maps can be a boon to supplement written texts with a 
visualization of these developments. To visualize the Dutch influence on military developments 
in and around Nagasaki this paper will also use the aforementioned ‘Hideshima archive’-
collection that the Leiden University Library acquired. This rich collection of documents can give 
 
42 J.H. Donker Curtius, Traktaat: Hunne Majesteiten de Koning der Nederlanden en de Taikoen van Japan (s.l. 1859). 
43 H.J. Moeshart and D. de Graeff van Polsbroek, Journaal van Jonkheer Dirk de Graeff van Polsbroek: Belevenissen 
van een Nederlands diplomaat in het negentiende eeuwse Japan (Maastricht 1987).  
44 P.F.B. von Siebold, Open Brieven uit Japan (Nagasaki 1861).   
45 Stellingwerf and Fabius, Zijne Majesteits radarstoomschip Soembing.  
46 M.C. Perry, R. Pineau (ed.), The Japan Expedition, 1852 – 1854 : The personal journal of Commodore Matthew C. 
Perry (Washington 1968). 
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us more insight in the knowledge that the Dutch passed on to the Japanese and how the 
Japanese (especially the Nabeshima-clan of the Saga domain) used this knowledge.  
  Because of the accessibility to primarily Dutch sources this paper has to be wary that 
most events will be seen through a ‘Dutch lens’. By adding sources and literature from other 
countries an attempt can be made to negate this as much as possible, but it is almost 
impossible to completely filter this Dutch perspective. Most of the Western sources in Japan at 
the time have also incorporated some form of exaggerations to make their feats appear 
grander than they were. A famous example of such an exaggeration is the arrival of 
Commodore Perry in the bay of Edo in 1853. American reports of the Japanese astonishment 
(both that of civilians as officials) at the arrival of American warships in the bay of Edo make it 
seem as if the event was similar to aliens visiting Earth. In reality, it is more realistic that there 
was mostly curiosity, as many in Japan were already to some degree aware of the 
developments in the world (especially among government officials), even if it was only on 
paper.48 To make sure such exaggerations are not accidentally accepted as truth such claims 
have to be cross-checked with other sources, like visual ones or other reports of the same 
event.      
  The main objective of this thesis is to create a more comprehensive narrative of 
declining Dutch influences on the development of Nagasaki after the opening of Japan and how 
this is tied to Nagasaki becoming a military-industrial centre. The influence of the Dutch can be 
seen as a last attempt to maintain an old system that they profited from and they hoped to 
compete with other Western nations for influence in Japan. Because they had an old 
connection with Japan they could still maintain their position for a while. Eventually, the 
competition from other Western nations became too strong and much of the Dutch influence 
of Japan was replaced by other nations, often building further on foundations the Dutch helped 
to build. This was especially the case in Nagasaki and its surroundings, where the presence of 
the Dutch was deeply tied with the city.  
 
 
48 Ravina, To Stand with the Nations, 89. 
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1. Laying the foundations for a modern Japanese military in Nagasaki, 1854 - 
1868 
The arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry with his modern Western-style steamships in 1853 
was the latest in a series of confrontations between Japan and the West. Even though Japan 
had successfully repulsed earlier attempts to reach its mainland, the sheer force Perry brought 
was a rude awakening. Many influential figures within Japan quickly realized that this gap in 
strength had to be closed, and soon. How to close this gap was the subject of many discussions, 
but a logical step for many was that Japan would rely first on its long-standing friendship with 
the Dutch. The Dutch were eager to supply the necessary help, hoping to retain their “special” 
position in Japan and staying ahead of the competition. They quickly supplied Japan with its 
first-ever steam-driven warship and also succeeded in opening the Naval Training School (which 
was founded in 1855 beside Deshima in Nagasaki). Dutch military knowledge also quickly 
managed to find its way into various other military sectors; like infantry drills, artillery and 
coastal defences.  
  Various research, both in the Netherlands as in other countries, already examined 
considerable parts of the founding of the Japanese navy and which role the Netherlands played 
in this. Especially the transfer of the Soembing, Japan’s first-ever steamship, is a much-
discussed (and celebrated) event in both Japanese and Dutch histories. Yet most of these 
papers either focus on either the Dutch achievements or on the Japanese navy side. How these 
military activities shaped the future of Nagasaki is much less examined in contemporary 
literature, while these activities can be seen as the root of the military-industrial complex in 
Nagasaki of the twentieth century. The aim of this chapter is to abridge the already established 
narratives of the Dutch training and Japanese navy and project how these shaped Nagasaki. As 
will be shown below, while the Nagasaki Training Centre was quite short-lived, the policies of 
the Dutch in Nagasaki(/Japan) and of the Japanese bakufu created an environment that 
required the rise of industry in the city and supplied it with a well-defended port that was ideal 
for later imperialistic ambitions. 
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1.1. Japan faced with a Western threat 
When Commodore Perry arrived in the bay of Edo in 1853 with his ‘Black Ships’ it was for many 
people the first time seeing the vast difference between Japanese and Western naval strength. 
The sight of Commodore Perry’s warships - two steam frigates and two sloops-of-war with the 
latest guns the West had available – entering Edo’s bay must have been an awe-inspiring sight 
to the local fishermen and other people going on about their daily lives. But to the military and 
higher officials of the bakufu, this incident was a vastly different experience. The sight of these 
warships was a wake-up call for many within the bakufu. The fact that the defence around the 
bay of Edo was pretty much powerless against the military power that Commodore Perry had at 
his disposal was a disgrace for high placed military officials.49 The sheer difference in power was 
also an important factor in Perry being able to dictate the terms in the negotiations of Japan 
opening a few of its ports to American ships. The arrival of these ships was not a complete 
surprise though, as the Dutch had already warned the Japanese government of the possibility 
of such an event in the years prior to Perry’s arrival. But to see the Japanese guardships – small 
wooden ships with no cannons, relying on the swords and rifles of its crew in combat – being 
nothing more than pesky annoyances to Perry’s ships, hit the officials who had been 
maintaining a status quo in maritime defences hard.50  
  Nonetheless, raising awareness for the need of a modern navy and coastal defences 
already happened many years before the arrival of Commodore Perry. Throughout the early 
nineteenth century, there were numerous attempts by various foreign powers to test Japan’s 
military power and their devotion to the sakoku policy51. Most famous of these incidents were 
probably the Rezanov delegation to Nagasaki (1804), the Phaeton incident (1808) and the 
Morrison incident (1837). The Rezanov delegation was an attempt by the Russian government 
to establish official trade relations with Japan after an earlier smaller delegation managed to 
book some diplomatic progress with the Japanese government. What the Russians did not 
 
49 McOmie, The Opening of Japan 1853-1855, 90 – 92. 
50 Ibid, 92 - 94. 
51 Sakoku (Jp. 鎖国, literally meaning ‘locked up country’) was the name given in the modern era to the collection 
of laws and policies enforced by the Tokugawa shogunate to regulate foreign trade and influences in Japan 
between 1836 and 1853. Even though there were many laws limiting trade, foreign trade did prosper during this 
era.  
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realize was that the success of the earlier delegation laid in its smaller scale and that the 
Japanese still refused any official contact.52 The much larger Rezanov delegation completely 
failed and was promptly dismissed from Nagasaki. In retaliation, ambassador Nikolai Rezanov 
(1764 – 1807) ordered that Russian vessels should raid several Japanese ports along the 
northern coasts, hoping displays of power would entice the Japanese to open communications. 
Even though some damages were inflicted on both sides during a couple of skirmishes, further 
escalation was not deemed profitable by either party.53 For now, the status quo in Japan’s 
relations with the outside world was successfully maintained.      
  The Phaeton incident of 1808 followed not long after the Rezanov’s visit to Japan and 
was the second unwanted visit by a foreign nation in a short period. But where Rezanov’s visit 
to Nagasaki itself was peaceful, besides the inability to bar them from entering Nagasaki, the 
Phaeton incident exposed the weaknesses in Japan’s coastal defence.54 The Phaeton made its 
way peacefully into the bay while flying a stolen Dutch flag. Once it was in the bay, the crew of 
the Phaeton took the Dutch and Japanese officials that came to inspect the ship hostage. The 
defenders of Nagasaki were completely powerless against the suddenly hostile frigate.55 Not 
only was Nagasaki completely undermanned (with roughly 50-60 defenders versus the 280 – 
350 men crew of the Phaeton56), the outdated cannons around the bay would also have had a 
near-impossible task in dealing with a fully-armed modern frigate like the Phaeton.57 The 
Phaeton incident of 1808 laid the weaknesses in the coastal defences bare and showed that 
reforms were desperately needed. This was even more painful for the bakufu when you 
compare the situation between the Rezanov attacks and the Phaeton. The Russian attacks on 
the northern ports were just relatively undefended coastal towns. Nagasaki, on the other hand, 
was supposed to be the most heavily guarded gate through which contact with the West was 
 
52 Ravina, To Stand with the Nations of the West, 58 -59. 
53 Ibid, 60 – 62.. 
54 N. Wilson, Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan (Cambridge, MA 2015) 114 – 
115. 
55 Ibid. 
56Ibid, 115. As the trading season was already almost over when the Phaeton arrived, the Nagasaki magistrate had 
already allowed domanial troops to return to their homes. Normally Nagasaki was supposed to have between 200 
and 400 men to man all the defensive positions.   
57 Ibid., 115 – 121. 
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maintained. And even the defences of Nagasaki were powerless against modern Western 
vessels.    
  While the Phaeton incident caused some (minor) changes in Nagasaki’s defences, these 
were fairly short-lived. The defence of the bay of Nagasaki was intensified, but within a decade 
a steep decline was seen again in the defensive initiatives. Guarding the coasts around Nagasaki 
with thousands of troops against a threat that may-or-may-not come was just too expensive to 
maintain. The biggest change that the Phaeton incident eventually brought was the “shell and 
repel” edict of 1825, in which uninvited foreign ships could be fired upon without any 
warning.58 This edict showed that the bakufu still had faith in its coastal defence capabilities, 
even around Nagasaki. And for the Japanese it had some minor successes, like with the 
Morrison incident of 1837. The Morrison was an attempt to open trade relations with Japan by 
the USA under the guise of returning some unfortunate Japanese castaways that they picked up 
in Canton. The morning after its arrival, the cannons around Edo’s bay opened fire upon the 
trade vessel and the same happened when the Morrison arrived later at Kagoshima (Southern 
Kyushu).59 Repelling the Morrison was a success for the bakufu and for now reaffirmed that 
they had the strength to maintain the sakoku policy.  
   The first major shifts in modernizing the coastal defences of Japan came when China 
clashed with the United Kingdom. The First Opium War in China (1839 – 1842) showed the vast 
power difference between East-Asian and Western navies. The Chinese navy was powerless in 
the face of the modern British ships and could not prevent a relatively small invasion force from 
raising havoc along the south-eastern coast. The resulting Treaty of Nanjing, in which China had 
to agree with humiliating concessions to the invading British troops, ended an era of seclusion 
policies for China.60 Thanks to the Treaty, China lost authority over its own ports and coastal 
territories, which was a worrying prospect for various bakufu officials. Throughout the 1840s 
the bakufu got numerous reports written by both their own officials and through Dutch 
channels about how China was steadily losing the ability to choose its own policies in coastal 
 
58 Ibid, 119 – 121. 
59 McOmie, The Opening of Japan 1853-1855, 24 – 31. 
60 C. C. Northrup ed., Encyclopedia of World Trade: From Ancient times to the Present, vol. 4 (New York 2005) 449 – 
450. 
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affairs. The Dutch on Deshima annually presented the news to the Japanese and report of the 
1840s not only mentions how China lost to the United Kingdom but also how other Western 
countries were eagerly sending their own envoys (escorted by warships) to force deals with the 
Chinese.61 Presenting the news of the humiliation of China seems to have been a tactic by the 
Dutch to slowly convince Japan to open its own ports. The Dutch saw the situation unfolding in 
China and if something similar would happen in Japan their monopoly would likely be 
undermined. 
  Thus the Dutch started preparing to prevent Japan from being opened by force and, 
more importantly to them, save their own monopoly on the Japanese trade. While the Dutch 
had not made any profits on the trade through Deshima for many decades, they still staunchly 
protected it. For the Dutch it was a source of prestige and they also saw opportunities to take 
advantage of their Japanese trade for the new situation in the Dutch East Indies (present-day 
Indonesia). Starting in the mid-1830s the Dutch started to produce considerable revenue 
through the newly enforced ‘cultivation system’62 in the Dutch East Indies and the need arose 
for new markets to sell these colonial products. With the changing situation in East-Asia, the 
Dutch saw their chance to turn Japan in one of these new markets and include Japan in their 
sphere of influence.63 So in 1844, an exchange happened that had not happened in the 
centuries before. The highest official of the Netherlands (at that time King William II) send a 
letter directly to the highest official of Japan (Shōgun Tokugawa Ieyoshi, 1793 - 1853)64.  In the 
letter, the Dutch king warned the Japanese government of the impending risks, as foreign 
powers were (supposedly) eagerly eyeing the opportunity to open the ports of Japan next. The 
situation in China, together with the ever more frequent incidents along the Japanese coasts, 
 
61 S. Iwao, Oranda Fūsetsufaki shūsei: A collection of the “world news” presented annually by the Dutch factory at 
Deshima to the Tokugawa shogunate 1641 – 1858 (Tokyo 1979) 386 – 399. 
62 The ‘cultivation system’ was a system employed in the Dutch Indies where, in theory, 20% of the agricultural 
land had to be devoted to crops destined for trade (‘cash crops’, like tobacco, tea etc.) or, farmers had to work 60 
days a year on government-owned lands. The system drastically increased the profits on the Dutch Indies trade 
during the mid-nineteenth century. 
63 Kogure, National Prestige, 32 – 33. 
64 Even though the exchange was technically on the highest level, the letter and response were in practice 
designed and treated by lower officials (on the Dutch side by the famous Philipp Franz von Siebold). Nonetheless, 
this was an unique occurrence and broke with the normal contact procedures that stipulated that contact was to 
be maintained through the Dutch trading post.  
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were the proof of this (according to the Dutch). 65 As such, the Dutch urged the Japanese to 
open their various ports on their own terms and increase the possibilities to conduct foreign 
trade through these ports (preferably in a manner that was advantageous to the Dutch). This 
would be the best compromise between two evils for the Japanese; taking away any casus belli 
for the foreigners to forcefully open the Japanese ports by allowing them to trade while still 
retaining control over its own borders.66 The answer from the Japanese was a disappointment 
though for the Dutch. In a letter from the Dutch minister of colonies it was described that the 
answer of the Japanese government was:  ‘While the Japanese saw the wisdom in the words of 
the Dutch, they could not indulge the Dutch with open ports or other advantages. To the 
Japanese, the policy of isolation was put in place by the wisdom of their ancestors and they 
were in no position to argue with their judgment.’.67 The answer of the Japanese made it clear 
that the status quo of the last centuries would remain until Commodore Perry arrived in 1853 
to open the ports (as the Dutch had warned would happen). Even though the status quo was 
maintained in the 1840s, a few prominent officials in Japan were already aware that large 
reforms were necessary if Japan were to protect its own policies. And Nagasaki, the frontline of 
Japan’s contact with the West, was the place where most of these changes were taking root.   
1.2. Training a modern navy in Nagasaki 
While the Dutch plans for the opening of ports were declined, the Dutch were still determined 
to maintain their unique position after the opening. And in 1854, when Perry forcefully opened 
the ports, an opportunity presented itself to Dutch. They hoped to gain this advantage by 
offering the Japanese something they desired most: a modern, Western-style navy. That the 
Japanese desired this themselves becomes abundantly clear from the annual imperial 
demand68 for the year 1854. The annual demand of that year was a very long list of ships, naval 
supplies and knowledge to be supplied by the Dutch in the summer of 1854 or as soon as 
 
65 Nationaal Archief The Hague, Ministerie van Koloniën (MvK) arch. nr. 20.10.02/inv. nr. 4294/458, Minuutbrief 
aan Ph. F. von Siebold (The Hague 3 November 1843). 
66 Ibid. 
67 Nationaal Archief The Hague, Kabinet des Konings (KdK) arch. nr. 2.02.04/inv. nr. 4186/M-20 ‘Brief van de 
minister van koloniën’ (21 May 1846). 
68 The Japanese annually requested a supply of objects from the Dutch as tribute, which could range from a wide 
variety of stuff. Among the objects were often scientific or exotic objects and books.  
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possible after that. Examples of things requested by the Japanese were: one (middle-sized) 
steamship, three or four corvettes, two brigs, various smaller boats, various experienced 
officers and sailors who could teach, naval books, naval mortars, cannons and many more 
military supplies.69 Even though the list was long, the Dutch moved quickly and supplied a part 
of the requested goods. Comparing the full list of demands to what the Dutch actually supplied, 
it is likely that the colonial government could only spare just enough ‘gifts’ to keep the Japanese 
satisfied to not start looking to other foreign powers. In the summer of 1854 the Zr. Ms 
Soembing arrived in Nagasaki, completely supplemented with an experienced crew. The crew of 
the Soembing, together with its Captain Gerhardus Fabius (1806 – 1888), was kept very busy 
during their stay in Nagasaki. Various Japanese detachments made daily visits to the ship to 
learn all about modern naval techniques and various high placed officials, like the governor of 
Nagasaki and the lord of the neighbouring province of ‘Fizen’70 (The Dutch name for the 
province Hizen, the Saga domain of the Nabeshima-clan), took time to inspect the Dutch 
warship (and the English squadron that visited Nagasaki simultaneously).  
  Though the diplomatic envoy of 1854 was a success, the Dutch were also well aware 
that they had to act quickly if they would keep this advantage. Donker Curtius (1792 – 1864), 
the Dutch commissioner in Japan (former position of opperhoofd), knew that the Dutch could 
not supply all the Japanese military demands as quickly as the Japanese wanted (especially 
compared to powers like Britain, the United States or Russia). So Donker Curtius tried to press 
this issue into an advantage for the Dutch. He informed Japanese officials that due to the 
complexity of the modern naval training it would be risky to have the exercises be conducted 
through the assistance of translators. So the commissioner requested that the Japanese would 
teach promising students the Dutch language so they could learn first-hand from Dutch 
teachers in Nagasaki.71 This request by Donker Curtius solved three problems for the Dutch. 
Firstly, teaching the Japanese Dutch would require some time. Time the Dutch could use very 
 
69 Nationaal Archief The Hague, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, 1609 – 1860, arch. nr. 1.04.21/inv. nr. 1689, Geheim 
Archief, Dagregister. Met bijlagen. 1853 november 15 - 1854 november 27 in: J.A. van der Chijs, Neêrlands streven 
tot openstelling van Japan voor den Wereldhandel (Amsterdam 1867) 431 – 435. 
70 Fabius and Stellingwerf ed., Zijne Majestejts Radarstoomschip Soembing, 35. 
71 Nationaal Archief The Hague, MvK, arch. nr. 2.10.02 inv. nr. 5861, Zeer Geheim Verbaal 1854, ‘Mening van het 
Nederlandsche Opperhoofd, 15 oktober 1853’, nr. 103 appendix G (20 March 1854). 
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well to work on fulfilling the various other demands. It also gave the commissioner and the 
colonial government time to negotiate with the Dutch government in The Hague to offer the 
Japanese more permanent supplies and commitments (like a naval training centre in 
Nagasaki72). Secondly, it gave the first generation of Japanese naval trainees a dependency on 
Dutch, thus limiting the basis of first-generation Japanese naval personnel to Dutch study 
materials until other languages would become available. And last, the Dutch hoped this would 
consolidate the basis of the Japanese navy in Nagasaki. This was where the Dutch had a base 
for over two centuries and were deeply entrenched in the system there. This would make it 
harder for other Western countries to bypass Dutch assistance to tap into exchanges with the 
Japanese (e.g. trade, knowledge and military).          
  As the training ventures of the first Japanese naval officers in Nagasaki turned out to be 
a great diplomatic success for the Dutch, they quickly sought to further expand this opportunity 
in their favour. By the time the Soembing left Japan again on the 26th of October 1854, around 
200 Japanese had followed the various training exercises that had been offered by the crew of 
the Soembing in Nagasaki. But while the training exercises that the Soembing supplied were a 
success, it was clear that if Japan really was to have a modern Western-style navy it would need 
more permanent institutions to supply enough well-trained officers and sailors. Without such 
institutions, it would be near-impossible to train the necessary personnel for a navy that could 
challenge the navies of the other major powers in the world.73 The dangers of an invasion by 
Western nations was prevalent prior to 1853, but this fear among bakufu officials had not 
dissipated after the opening. Among certain groups within Japan the idea of “conquer or be 
conquered” was slowly spreading. And one way to protect against such threats is to make sure 
you can stand toe-to-toe with the other major nations. To do this they were prepared to make 
 
72 Donker Curtius proposed a naval training center outside Deshima in Nagasaki shortly after requesting that the 
Japanese trainees would learn Dutch. This training center was eventually established in 1855 and would also give 
the Dutch more freedom of movement; Nationaal Archief The Hague, MvK, arch. nr. 2.10.02 inv. nr. 5861, Zeer 
Geheim Verbaal 1854, ‘Brief van Donker Curtius aan de Gouverneur van Nagasaki, 22 oktober 1853’, nr. 103 
appendix GG (20 March 1854).   
73 V. Enthoven, ‘Oude vrienden: De Nederlandse rol bij de opbouw van de Japanse marine, 1850 – 1870’ in: E. 
Buchheim, V. Enthoven, T. Jackson etc, Leidschrift: Tussen vriendschap en vijandschap: Nederland en Japan door de 
eeuwen heen 33:2 (2018) 77. 
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any necessary investment to create a strong navy. One that could potentially rule the seas.74 It 
was these world views of various key figures within the bakufu which gave impulses to the 
creation of a modern military and navy. It also provided opportunities for Western nations, like 
the Netherlands, UK, USA and France, to supply necessary knowledge and military equipment in 
return for diplomatic concessions from the Japanese. This seems to have been an important 
tool of the Dutch to try and exert more influence in Japan and compete with the other Western 
nations.    
  The biggest change in creating the modern navy for the Japanese in Nagasaki came with 
the transfer of the Soembing to the Japanese navy and the opening of the Nagasaki Naval 
Training Center (1855 – 1859, see figure 1) in October and November of 1855 respectively. The 
transfer of the Soembing was a diplomatic move by Donker Curtius to reaffirm the friendship 
between the Netherlands and Japan, whilst simultaneously hoping to show the Japanese that 
the Dutch could supply any requested equipment (and quicker than other foreign nations could. 
A steamship was on their annual demand after all). That other nations were vying for the same 
goals becomes clear when noting that mere days after the transfer of the Soembing (now 
renamed Kankō Maru) a similar offer for a warship was sent to the Nagasaki magistrate by the 
English commander in Japan.75 The opening of the Naval Training Center happened in 
conjunction with the transfer of the Soembing, as the students could get first-hand experience 
with the theoretical knowledge they learned at the Training Centre on Japan’s own steam 
warship.76 
   The Soembing that the Netherlands supplied was far from “state of the art” though 
when it was transferred in 1855. It was even already deemed near-obsolete, as paddle 
steamers (like the Soembing) were rapidly replaced by propeller-driven steamships in the 
1840s/1850s.77 The proposed gifting of the warship led to some commotion within the Dutch 
parliament, as various members did not agree with the Ministry of Colonies transferring a 
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warship from the already (abysmal) naval defence of the East-Indies to a foreign power.78 
Eventually, the parliament was placated by the promise that this was a good opportunity to 
replace the near-obsolete Soembing with a newer ship, as the Dutch recently also acquired the 
capabilities to build newer (propeller-driven) frigates.79 Nonetheless, the visit of Fabius with his 
Soembing to Nagasaki was regarded as a diplomatic success by the Dutch at the time. At the 
end of the Fabius’ visit in 1854, the Japanese reaffirmed their friendship with the Dutch, 
declared that they would look to Dutch for their modernization and they simultaneously 
ordered two new propeller-driven warships (which were actually modern in the 1850s).80 It was 
a desperate gamble of the Dutch to stay ahead of the British and Americans, but for now, the 
Japanese were unaware of the outdated state of most of the Dutch naval material. The now 
renamed Kankō-maru would serve as a training vessel while two modern Dutch-built frigates 
would join the Japanese navy in the following years.   
  When you look at the total numbers of the personnel trained at the Naval Training 
Centre, it may seem to have been a fairly small-scale endeavour. During its four year existence, 
the Naval Training Centre only trained two classes; the first of 1855 – 1857 had twenty-two 
students (with four officers) and the second of 1857 – 1859 had thirty-seven students (with six 
officers). Besides these men around forty imperial students and twelve students from Kyushu 
domain daimyo81 joined the second group (thus totalling 128 students, though some imperial 
students were soon after relocated to the newly founded training school in Edo in 1858).82 The 
new training school in Edo was founded by the old Japanese director of the Nagasaki Naval 
Training Centre, to the regret of the Dutch. Fabius was of opinion that moving the training 
school to Edo would cause a divide between the Japanese and the Dutch because training 
would now occur far away from the century-old outpost of Deshima. As such, many influential 
Dutch officers, like Fabius and Gerhard Pels Rijcken (1810 – 1889, Dutch commander of the 
 
78 The whole naval defense of the East-Indies was undertaken by twelve warships, most of which were by either 
obsolete ships or ships in disrepair; Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Verslag der Handelingen van de Tweede 
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Nagasaki Naval Training School) were of opinion that training should continue in Nagasaki. They 
emphasized that training in Nagasaki would have been the best for both Japan and the 
Netherlands.83 Nonetheless, the bakufu saw it differently. They knew that the Dutch could not 
keep up with their increasing demands and many bakufu officials thought it was important to 
centralize the training of new officers near Edo (closer to the seat of shogunal power).84 This 
conviction of the Dutch military personnel showed that it was clear to them that Dutch 
influence on Japan was tied to the city of Nagasaki. To them, Nagasaki was the place where 
they were pulling the strings and could influence the Japanese to a degree. In the other major 
cities they had to start from scratch beside countries like the USA, the UK and France. The 
Netherlands would not long keep up with these countries without a head-start and they were 
very much aware of that.  
 
Figure 1 Students of various clans march to the Nagasaki Naval Training Center, situated in front of Deshima.  
Painted by 陣内松齢 (Jinnai Songling) ‘Nagasaki Naval Training Center’, mid-nineteenth century, Chokokan Museum, Saga, 
Japan. http://www.nabeshima.or.jp/collection/index.php?mode=display_itemdetail&id=101 [last visit 16-07-2019] 
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  But while the numbers trained by the Dutch in Nagasaki were relatively small, their 
impact on Japan was larger, as various naval students of the Dutch took up key positions in the 
Bakumatsu (and later Meiji-era) navy and government. The first graduates of the Nagasaki 
Naval Training Centre were vital in manning early naval expeditions of the Japanese. The Dutch 
built Kanrin Maru (transferred to Japan in 1857) had a large detachment from the Nagasaki 
trainees and escorted the first-ever delegation of Japanese to the USA in 1860.85 Including the 
Kankō Maru (Soembing) and Kanrin Maru the Netherlands build a total of seven ships for the 
Japanese (six for the shogunate and one for the Satsuma domain) between 1855 and 1869, 
forming a considerable contribution to the early shogunal steam-powered navy.86 The initial 
crew of these ships was largely reliant on students from the Nagasaki Naval Training Centre. 
These ships and the Nagasaki naval knowledge was later also applied in Edo and Kobe, where 
new training institutions (1859 and 1864 respectively) were founded (near the shogunal seat of 
power in Edo).87 Secondly, among the graduates of the Nagasaki Naval Training Center were 
some persons who would grow out to become influential in the late Bakamatsu and early Meiji 
eras. Examples of these graduates are the statesman and naval engineer Katsu Kaishū (1823 - 
1899), who lead the delegation to the USA in 1860, founded the Kobe Naval Training Center 
and played an important role in Japan’s further modernization during the Meiji period88, and 
Enomoto Takeaki (1836 – 1908) who became an admiral of the Tokugawa navy and was one of 
the founders of the Meiji-period ‘Imperial Japanese Navy’ (IJN).89 How these two prominent 
individuals regarded their own studies under the Dutch is an interesting question for their 
biographies, but these were regretfully behind a language barrier for this thesis. Some of these 
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individuals, like the above mentioned two graduates, also received ministerial positions in the 
Meiji-government after 1869 and helped shape Japan’s policies in the late nineteenth century.  
  And lastly, which is important for the nature of Nagasaki, this training centre laid the 
foundation for the course the city of Nagasaki would take in the next century. The Training 
Center itself only existed for roughly four years, but before it was moved, various naval facilities 
were also built in Nagasaki. Among these facilities were repair facilities and naval construction 
foundries/factories (more about these in chapter 2).90 During the times of the Training Center, 
these facilities were still fairly small, even though they were significant in the sense of being 
some of the first-ever in Japan. But as time progressed into the 1870s/1880s these facilities 
would grow out to become the bustling Mitsubishi Shipyards that would dominate Nagasaki by 
the turn of the twentieth century. Especially as trade moved away from Nagasaki (more in 
chapter 3) would these changes in the city’s character become very clear to its inhabitants.  
1.3.  Modernizing the army and coastal defences 
While the Dutch influence on the modernization efforts of the Japanese navy was a celebrated 
prestige project for both the Netherlands and the bakufu, more covertly was Dutch military 
knowledge also utilized by various daimyo to modernize their local armies and coastal defences 
of Japan. The modernization of the army and coastal defences can also be placed in the 
‘conquer or be conquered’ sentiment that was spreading in Japan as local daimyo saw 
opportunities to fulfil their own ambitions during the Bakumatsu (as became clear with the 
eventual Meiji Restoration). The modernization of the land forces started already a few decades 
before the opening of Japan (albeit at a relatively slow pace). That this was already happening 
earlier is not surprising, as it fits into Japan’s sakoku policy. The sakoku policy closed the 
countries from the seas and relied on the superiority of Japan’s armies and forts. 91 So it makes 
sense that the early modernization efforts were primarily aimed at modernizing the land forces, 
before shifting towards the seas. The need for this modernization became even more clear due 
to the failed encounters with hostile foreign powers during the first half of the nineteenth 
century (the Rezanov delegation attacks and the Phaeton incident). The initial modernization 
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efforts after these incidents were primarily undertaken by Kyushu daimyo, especially those who 
were responsible for the defence of Nagasaki (like the Nabeshima of the Saga domain and the 
Kuroda-clan of the Fukuoka-domain). These two clans were since the seventeenth century the 
prime defenders of Nagasaki and formed the frontline of Japan’s contact with the West.92  
  Musketry was not a new phenomenon in Japan in the mid-nineteenth century. Even 
though Japan is often portrayed in popular media as a country of “samurai and cavalry”, by the 
end of the sixteenth century various famous daimyo (like Oda Nobunaga (1534 – 1582), 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537 – 1598) and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543 – 1616)) fielded large 
contingents of matchlock troops, and even cannons, with devastating effect.93 After the 
Phaeton incident of 1808, a rise can be noted again in interest for modernizing matchlock 
troops contingents, especially in domains closest to Nagasaki (e.g. Saga, Fukuoka and Satsuma). 
94 That this was most noticeable in these Kyushu domains is not surprising. These domains were 
at the forefront of encounters with foreign powers that sought contact with Japan. Because of 
this they were also very aware of the firepower the West wielded (as they often witnessed 
events like the Phaeton incident first-hand). As a result, multiple Japanese military scientists 
and engineers started to study Western warfare and military technology through their contact 
with the Dutch (in a similar sense as rangaku was studied).  
  One famous example of these studies is Takashima Shūhan (1798 – 1866). Takashima 
was born in 1798 as the son of one of Nagasaki’s elders. Because of his father’s position he 
witnessed the contact with the Dutch on Deshima from a young age. In time he also became a 
city official and came in contact with opperhoofd Johan Wilhelm de Sturler (1773 – 1855. 
Opperhoofd between 1823 – 1826).95 De Sturler was a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars (where 
he rose to the rank of colonel) and gained considerable military experience. Through his contact 
with De Sturler, Takashima learned various Western(/Dutch) military techniques and tactics; 
e.g. the use of drill exercises to instil discipline in foot soldiers and how newer models of 
artillery had to be deployed along infantry (mostly based on late Napoleonic-era warfare 
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techniques). Takashima used this Dutch military knowledge to develop his own musketry style 
(Takashima-ryū) which gained himself the patronage of various daimyo on Kyushu.96 The 
daimyo of Kyushu (and southern Honshu) eagerly adopted these exercises to Westernize their 
local armies in the 1820s – 1840s. Takashima even got national fame and got to show his drill 
exercises in Edo in 1841 to an audience of high-placed shogunate officials. But his rise to fame 
also got Takashima high placed enemies, especially among those who wanted to limit Western 
influence in Japan. In 1842 false charges were forged by high placed enemies to incarcerate 
Takashima, but by then various new Western military models were already adopted by daimyo 
armies.97 For now was the shogunate not yet actively pushing for modernization of its forces 
but instead, only local daimyo were prepared to take this step of (small-scale) Westernization 
of their armies.   
  The development of coastal defences in Japan before the opening of Japan had more 
success. Nabeshima Naomasa (1815 – 1871), daimyo of the Saga domain, was one of the 
Kyushu lords who took great interest in rangaku during the 19th century (others, like the 
Satsuma domain, were also very interested in rangaku, but not as closely associated with the 
defence of Nagasaki). Nabeshima was an ambitious man and was in a way the main force 
behind the modernization of coastal defences in Japan. His father, Nabeshima Narinao (1780 – 
1839), was as daimyo in charge of Nagasaki’s defences during the Phaeton incident. The failed 
defence of Nagasaki mostly led to a loss of prestige for the Saga domain.  As future heir to this 
domain and as a man with many ambitions, Naomasa wanted to avoid a similar incident during 
his reign.98 When Naomasa became the daimyo of the Nabeshima family in 1830 (though he 
only got full control in 1835), became remodelling the Nagasaki harbour defences one of his 
primary prestige projects.  
  Naomasa went great lengths to realize his plans and pushed the limits of what was 
acceptable as a tozama daimyo99. An example of this is the unsanctioned visit he made to the 
Dutch warship Palembang in 1844. When the Dutch warship visited Nagasaki to deliver the 
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letter of King William II, it was a major opportunity to examine the modern weaponry the 
warship wielded. Naomasa was not eager to let this opportunity slip by and visited the warship 
without permission of any Tokugawa officials.100 Normally such unsanctioned contact between 
a tozama daimyo and a foreign power would have led to major repercussions, but Naomasa 
managed to get away with it by explaining it as a necessity to defend Japan effectively.101 Most 
likely Naomasa was not punished for this action because he was a vital part of Japan’s coastal 
defence in a time that the threat from abroad increased rapidly.102 Thanks to the visit to the 
Palembang, and to his other contacts with the Dutch as a defender of Nagasaki, Naomasa got 
vital information to modernize coastal defences. In the 1840s and 1850s he undertook massive 
projects to realize his visions, with some great successes. Evidence of Naomasa’s modernization 
efforts are found in various remnants of Nabeshima-clan archives and collections. Most of 
these archives/collections are still found in Japan, but one of these archives is also found 
recently in the Leiden University Library in the Netherlands.103 
   The Hideshima archive (Hideshima was a translator family of the Nabeshima-clan, 
though it is unclear if this individual also directly worked for the Nabeshima) in Leiden features 
a wide selection of various documents regarding the military modernization that took place 
through the contact of the Nabeshima clan with the Dutch (most documents are dated for the 
1850s and early 1860s). Among these documents are a wide selection of schematics of 
cannons, an index of flags of many foreign powers, drill exercises, cannon emplacement 
techniques and other Western military knowledge.  
  
 
100 Ibid, 122 – 124. 
101 Wilson, Defensive Positions, 122 – 124. 
102 Ibid, 126 – 132. 
103 Hideshima, Hideshima Archive of the Nabeshima han, Or. 27.750 Shelf 22.513 F, (Leiden University Library, 
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Figure 2 A schematic of a cannon parts, here specifically the carriage that a cannon rests on. Hideshima, Hideshima Archive of 
the Nabeshima-han, Or. 27.750 Shelf 22.513 F, (Leiden University Library, Leiden) document 11, drawing of cannons with text. 
 
These documents have only recently emerged and are a potential source for many new insights 
into the Dutch-Japanese military knowledge exchanges. While studying these documents it 
becomes clear that these documents reaffirm the reports that had thus far been almost 
exclusively found in only written sources.  A good example of these are the schematics of the 
cannons. Cannons were one of the defining aspects of improving the Nagasaki coastal defences. 
When Naomasa visited the Palembang he observed that the cannons were one the aspects that 
had grown in effectiveness in the nineteenth century. Not only did Western steamships now 
wield bigger artillery pieces, but they could also fire further, more accurately and the warships 
were more manoeuvrable.104 The Japanese gun emplacements of the 16th – 18th centuries 
would have considerable problems if they were to target newer steamships. For Naomasa 
Nagasaki was the perfect place to show that he could realize his ambitions in employing 
Japanese-build large-bore cannons. 105 Nagasaki was also the frontline of the contact with 
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foreign powers and it was closely watched by Tokugawa officials. Nagasaki was thus the best 
place to test such new artillery pieces and simultaneously show off the capabilities of your 
domain to the Tokugawa shogunate. 
  The result of these ambitions was that in the year 1850, four years prior to the opening 
of Japan, the Saga domain managed to create the first cast-iron furnace that was able to create 
metallurgy on an industrial scale in Japan with knowledge gained through the Dutch. This 
foundry focussed on producing cannons and other cast-iron weaponry and would play an 
important role in arming pro-imperial forces during the Meiji Restoration.106 It is very likely that 
the designs of these cannons fabricated in the Saga domain coincide with the schematics that 
are found in the Hideshima archive. The schematic in figure 2 not only features drawings of 
how various cannon parts (here featuring parts of the carriage) had to look, there are also small 
notes of the lengths of parts and construction instructions featured. Saga domanial troops were 
also extensively trained in the use of these guns and were taught various drill exercises to battle 
in file and rank, the standard in European warfare in the late 18th and early 19th century. In 
figure 3 you can see a depiction of one such training exercises, while figure 4 features a training 
booklet for officers. The booklet has many different variations of exercises and with notes in 
Japanese how to conduct these. Other booklets in this archive describe the different commands 
(in both Dutch and Japanese translations) that are needed to command the troops.  
  These Saga troops were also important in manning the new gun emplacements on the 
many islands outside Nagasaki bay, a new type of defence line that was adopted to intercept 
potential hostile vessels before they could enter the bay and lay waste to the city.107 Figure 5 
depicts how to employ a so-called ‘killing zone’ by utilizing the many small islands in front of the 
bay of Nagasaki, minimizing the room hostile ships had to manoeuvre. On map 1 is then 
depicted how such a ‘killing zone’ is employed in Nagasaki. With red dots and squares, the 
various gun batteries and lookout are depicted, while red lines likely show the firing arcs of 
these batteries. While these new gun emplacements lacked the necessary rifling techniques to 
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effectively engage steamships and were already moved back towards the inside of the bay by 
the early 1860s (to quell any potential hostilities between Japanese and foreigner in 
Nagasaki)108 they nonetheless had a profound influence on the following decades. Not only did 
the experiments in Nagasaki bay lead to the erection of new coastal defences in other treaty 
ports in Japan (like Edo (now Tokyo), Osaka, Hakodate and others)109, for Nagasaki these 
defences set the port town up as a fortified harbour in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century.   
  With these new defences (in and outside the bay), its natural sheltered bay surrounded 
with mountains and the knowledge of Western military techniques located in the city (thanks to 
the Naval Training Centre and the Saga Domain efforts, both through contact with the Dutch) 
Nagasaki was set to become a prime military-industrial port town. The Dutch had supplied the 
Japanese through Nagasaki with the best military material and knowledge they could miss at 
the time (even if it was not always the best in the world). But as the needs of the Japanese 
changed, various parts of the military institutions in Nagasaki were transferred away from the 
Dutch to Edo, Osaka and Edo. Nonetheless, even though the training centre moved away, the 
foundation of other supporting industrial facilities was already constructed by the Dutch in 
Nagasaki. These will be further discussed in chapter 2. It was this combination of lingering 
military-knowledge combined with these supporting facilities that Nagasaki started to further 
evolve into a military-industrial complex.  
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Figure 3 Saga domanial troops being trained in Nagasaki. In the middle two Dutchmen are visible, who are supervising the 
exercises. Hideshima, Hideshima Archive of the Nabeshima han, Or. 27.750 Shelf 22.513 F, (Leiden University Library, Leiden) 
document 13 Drawings Color. 9 sheets with drawings. 
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Figure 4 Drill exercises on paper based on Dutch knowledge. The booklet has a few dozen different drills described with various 
movement orders, positions for officers and cannon position within ranks. Hideshima, Hideshima Archive of the Nabeshima han, 
Or. 27.75 
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Figure 5 Chart where an example is given of a so-called 'kill zone', an area where high concentration of fire makes it near 
impossible to avoid getting hit. The islands outside of Nagasaki bay functioned as a 'kill zone' for incoming hostile vessels. 
Hideshima, Hideshima Archive of the Nabeshima han, Or. 27.750 Shelf 22.513 F, (Leiden University Library, Leiden) document 7: 
Map with cutout. Colour. Details of an island and present buildings. 
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Map 1 Detail of Nagasaki bay map, with various foreign vessels and (in red) the various gun emplacements that guarded 
Nagasaki bay. With red lines the targeting direction is shown and how the islands created a "kill zone" by cross-firing on any ship 
attempting to enter the bay with ill-intention. Hideshima, Hideshima Archive of the Nabeshima han, Or. 27.750 Shelf 22.513 F, 
(Leiden University Library, Leiden) document 5: Map. Colour. Depiction of the bay of Nagasaki, military vessels and positions. 
Legend in red on the bottom left. 
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2. Fuelling the fires of modern industry, 1854 - 1900 
A commonly accepted notion is that the industrial modernization of Japan started after the 
opening of Japan in 1854. Yet in reality, just as in the preceding chapter with the modernization 
of the military, the basis for the modernization of industry in Japan already happened in the 
decades prior to 1854. This is not entirely surprising as the rise of modern industry was, to an 
extent, tied to the need for a modern army. Just as described in chapter 1, for various high 
placed officials it became exceedingly clear in the early nineteenth century that a modern army 
was necessary to defend Japan against any potential foreign incursions. The ability to defend 
the homeland meant little if Japan did not have the means to supply its own demand for 
resources and equipment. Japan needed a strong industry to further its ambitions. 
  The influence of Dutch engineers in Japan is a subject that has been mostly studied on a 
microlevel, mostly examining the achievements of individual engineers. The engineers H. 
Hardes (1815 – 1871), J.K. van den Broek (1814 – 1865) en J. de Rijke (1842 – 1913) are 
engineers (to name a few) who are widely known, both in Dutch and Japanese literature. Yet 
while their achievements are closely studied, they are rarely framed within the larger 
developments at the time in Japan. And then specifically in Nagasaki, as most of these Dutch 
engineers worked in this city and its surroundings. This chapter aims to bridge the activities of 
the Dutch engineers in Nagasaki and frame them within the industrial developments of the city 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. This will be done to show that that influence 
of the Dutch engineers laid the foundation, either direct or indirect (sometimes alongside other 
Western nations’ engineers), for the later industrial course that Nagasaki would take in the late 
nineteenth and twentieth century. To do this, this chapter will first set out to explain which 
(social/geographical) factors in Nagasaki and its surroundings made it ideal for industrial 
activities. After that, the second part of this chapter will narrate how industry, construction and 
engineering grew in Nagasaki (before and after 1854), and its direct surroundings on Kyushu, 
through contact with the Dutch. These two aspects of the chapter have an important role in 
explaining the circumstances in how a relatively small international trading town grew out to 
become a major (military-)industrial complex and which role the Dutch played in this 
development.  
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2.1. How to build an industrial port-city 
Before we can delve into the development of Nagasaki into an industrial complex in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, it is first important to establish which conditions are vital for an 
industrial port city to prosper. These conditions have to be examined to understand why 
Nagasaki was an ideal location for such endeavours and how/why Dutch influence could take 
root there. Not every town that is situated on the coast can as easily be developed into a 
thriving industrial port, as industrial port towns (and port towns in general) are highly 
dependent on the right surroundings, infrastructure and the availability of necessary knowledge 
and capital.110 This paragraph will examine what these necessary conditions are for a port town 
and how these correlate with Nagasaki.111   
  The first condition of any port city to flourish comes in the form of its surroundings and 
the infrastructure that connect these surroundings. Most important for this is how a port city 
connects between the ‘outside world’ and its hinterland. Goods have to be able to flow into the 
port from all over the world and then easily be able to transport towards the internal market, 
but simultaneously, goods from the internal market also have to be able to easily reach the port 
city. Most port cities that flourished in Europe in the nineteenth/twentieth century were ports 
that had the best connection with the hinterland (be it through rivers, railways or other 
transport methods).112 Nagasaki does not stand out on this point. Not only was Nagasaki’s 
position as ‘international trade port’ initially chosen because it was far away from the major 
cities of the country (e.g. Edo, Kyoto and Osaka), the bay of Nagasaki was also renowned for its 
sheltered, mountainous surroundings.113 While these mountains were renowned natural 
protection in the time of sails ( especially in an area that is frequently plagued by typhoons, 
around three to eight pass over Nagasaki annually114), they severely limited the ability to build 
infrastructure in the modern era. If goods were to be transported from and to Nagasaki, it had 
 
110 M.B. Miller, Europe and the Maritime World: A Twentieth Century History (New York 2012) 23 – 32. 
111 This paragraph is based on an early essay: D. Verhoeven, Modernizing the Gateway: The development of the 
maritime landscape of Nagasaki during the time of Imperial Japan, 1853 – 1945 (Leiden 2017). This essay has been 
adapted and expanded to be used within the context of this chapter. 
112 Miller, Europe and the Maritime World, 25 – 27. 
113 D. Pacheco, ‘The founding of the Port of Nagasaki and its Cession to the Society of Jesus”, Monumenta 
Nipponica 25:3/4 (1970) 308 – 309. 
114 Japan Guide, ‘Typhoons’, https://www.japan-guide.com/e/e2117.html. [last visited on 02-09-2019] 
39 
 
to be by cargo ship across the oceans and seas that surround Japan.115 This thus logically limited 
the potential of a port city that aimed at supplying an internal market. This also explains why 
Nagasaki is quickly replaced by other cities that were more conveniently located for trade in 
Japan; like Osaka, Kobe and Yokohama. 
  But even though its (once renowned) location did not help Nagasaki in the modern era, 
the city had some other advantages that other port cities did not have. These were the exact 
advantages that Nagasaki needed to grow into an industrial port city. Most important of these 
advantages is the availability of coal. Coal is a vital resource for any major industry to be able to 
exist, especially in the nineteenth century where steam-engines were powered with coal. In 
Europe, the availability of coal deposits dictated if locations were suited for the growth of 
industry. Countries with major coal deposits, like England and Germany, managed to reach 
higher levels of industrial growth throughout the nineteenth century than competitors who did 
not have the same access to coal (e.g. France, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain).116 The same 
dependence on coal for the existence of major industry was also present in Japan. But the 
necessity to have easy access to coal (and other natural resources) was an issue for a country 
like Japan, where resources were fairly scarce.  
  The first chapter already established that Japan had a dire need for a strong (heavy) 
industry if its military would ever be able to operate on the same level as the other major 
powers in the world. Most of the strongest military nations in the world, like the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom and Germany (after 1870) were also characterized by having 
access to large amounts of natural resources and formidable industrial power.117 Compared to 
these other major nations had Japan only relatively limited natural resources in its territory. As 
seen on map 2 (see page 42), major coal deposits are only found on Hokkaido (in the north of 
Japan), near Onahama (near present-day Tokyo) and on Kyushu (near Nagasaki). It is thus 
logical that if Japan were to gain a powerful modern army it would either have to develop these 
domestic coal fields or find other sources abroad (either through trade or conquering 
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territories). 
  The potential importance of the coal deposits of Kyushu is also already noted by the 
various international reports that circulated in the 1830s and 40s. International sources, like the 
Asiatic Journal (vol. 29 of 1839)118, the Chinese Repository (Vol. 9 of 1840)119 and A.G. Findlay’s 
A directory for the navigation of the Pacific Ocean (1851)120, to name a few, all make special 
mention of Philipp Franz von Siebold’s report of the importance of the coal on Kyushu that he 
witnessed during his travel to Edo in 1826121. Siebold reports that the coal around Nagasaki is of 
good enough quality to be made into coke for furnaces, which is a fairly uncommon resource in 
Japan.122 After the opening of Japan, coal mining around Nagasaki quickly grew to large 
proportions. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Takashima coal mine and the Hashima 
coal mines (just south of Nagasaki) became together some of the biggest coal suppliers of the 
Kyushu-based industries (and even Japan as a whole).123 The nearby presence of coal was thus 
already regarded as an important asset for Nagasaki and soon became an important factor for 
the rise of industry in the region. And it was the Dutch presence in the city, together with 
various British engineers, that played a role in the creation of the necessary mining facilities to 
exploit these coal fields, as will be explained in the next paragraph.  
 
118 A. Parbury  and Co., Asiatic Journal (London 1839) 195. 
119 Anon, The Chinese Repository (Canton 1840) 385.  
120 A.G. Findlay, A Directory for the Navigation of the Pacific Ocean: Volume 1 (New York 2013) 639. 
121 P.F. von Siebold, Manners and Customs of the Japanese: Japan and the Japanese in the Nineteenth Century. 
From Recent Dutch Travels, Especially the Narrative of Von Siebold, edited by J. Murray (London 1852) 97. 
122 Ibid. 
123 N. Murakushi, ‘Technology and Labour in Japanese Coal Mining’, Project on Technology Transfer: The Japanese 
Experience (Tokyo 1980) 6 -7. 
41 
 
 
Map 2 Minerals in Japan. Most of the coal deposits in Japan were found in the north of Japan (where winters were much 
harsher) and in the south, on Kyushu (near Nagasaki). Source: University of Texas, 'Japan Minerals Map' (online image, 1971) 
available at http://www.mappery.com/Japan-Minerals-Map [04-09-2019]. 
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 But there were also other important, more political, factors in Nagasaki’s surroundings 
that gave it way to becoming an industrial centre. Firstly, Nagasaki was also an ideal connection 
between Japan and greater Asia.  After Japan opened up to the West, more changed than just 
Japan’s technology and political landscape. A shift in ideology also started to take root in these 
years, a shift towards imperialism. During the Bakumatsu-period was Japan, sometimes 
violently (like the Bombardment of Kagoshima by the British in 1863), but mostly economically 
confronted with the Western notions of imperialism. 124 While Japan was never colonized like 
many Asian and African countries, it was heavily economically exploited by foreign countries. 
The Tokugawa government overall successfully faced many imperialistic notions from the West 
(trade did triple during the Bakumatsu period125), but they nonetheless greatly suffered under 
the so-called ‘Unequal Treaties’ (like the American Harris Treaty of 1858) that heavily favoured 
Western foreigners operating in Japan. The main two problems of these treaties were the 
extraterritoriality granted to foreigners and the one-sided tariffs that were imposed. The 
extraterritoriality agreements ruled that foreigners were henceforth judged under their own 
countries’ jurisdiction when breaking the law, instead of by the laws of Japan.126 The tariff laws 
gave Western countries almost complete control over trade tariffs with Japan. As a result, 
Japan lost a degree of sovereignty over its own domestic market and only made relatively small 
amounts on tariffs (Japan’s income from tariffs was only 3%, while countries like Germany and 
America earned roughly 50% of their trade income through tariffs).127 Japan was an 
independent country, but through these treaties occasionally exploited by their Western 
‘peers’. This perceived unfairness led to growing dissatisfaction across the country, especially in 
the southern domains. Such interactions with Western powers were vastly different from their 
relations with the West in the past centuries, where they had often been the dominant power.  
  The Tokugawa shogunate did not survive this fairly sudden change in their power 
situation and they eventually fell to a combined coalition of Satsuma and Chōshū domain forces 
(and contingents from other Kyushu-domains) who perceived this as a weakness. After the 
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Meiji Restoration was the Emperor reinstated and the Satchō-alliance128 became the ruling 
power in Japan.129 The new Satchō-alliance led to two major changes, which were intertwined 
with each other; the rise of imperialism and moving various institutions to Satchō-aligned 
territories (which were mostly on Kyushu). It was between these two situations that Nagasaki 
could rise as an industrial powerhouse. While Nagasaki was directly governed by the Tokugawa, 
the city was situated directly between domains that were aligned to the Satchō-alliance. This 
made Nagasaki ideal to develop further for the Satchō-alliance during the Meiji-period (besides 
Nagasaki already being a developed port city during the Edo-period) as will be explained further 
below.  
  The rise for imperialism in Japan saw an increase in the need for strong naval and 
military-industrial centres. After the Meiji Restoration Japan started to look increasingly 
outwards. The first step in its territorial expanse came in the form of solidifying Japan’s control 
on its southern and northern borders. Japan already had close contact with the Ainu people in 
the north (mostly surrounding modern Hokkaido) and the Ryukyuans (on the modern Okinawa 
islands). During the 1870s both of these countries/regions were assimilated by the Japanese 
state.130 With Hokkaido and the Ryukyus now secured, Japan could look towards its 
neighbouring countries for further expansion. These were the first steps of a country that was 
set to walk a similar imperial road as many Western countries. The next step for Japan was to 
look for new countries to include in their sphere of influence, to use these as a market for its 
goods and to gain the natural resources that Japan desperately needed to develop its 
industrialization efforts.  
       The prime targets for this were the countries to the west of Japan; Korea and China. 
Both Korea and China were a massive potential market to sell Japan’s trade goods and were 
also bountiful with much-needed resources (like coal, iron, wheat and gold). This was especially 
the case in the northern region historically known as Manchuria. If Japan were to get a foothold 
in this region it would greatly expand its capabilities to further increase its sphere of 
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influence.131 To increase their might over these regions hard military power was deemed 
necessary. Historically, Japan always had a strong land-based army. During moments like the 
Meiji Restoration (and the related Boshin War of  1868-1869132) Japan showed that even after 
two hundred years of relative peace, it was still a potent force. The navy, on the other hand, 
had greatly suffered during the Edo-period, where Japan mostly retreated from the seas. As the 
first chapter explained Japan had gained a few modern naval ships through its contact with the 
Dutch and other Western countries in the years of the Bakumatsu-period. These were the 
foundation for a new modern navy, but many more were needed than these few ships.  
  Because of this, after the Meiji Restoration, many ports in Satchō-territory in southern 
Japan were chosen to be modernized and further expanded to build the new Japanese Imperial 
Navy. Similarly, trading ports were also expanded to host greater trade volume, both in the size 
of the ships they could handle and in the number of goods they could store. These two 
development are related because conquering new territories was also to gain more trade 
power.133 Nagasaki was thus one of the cities situated within the Satchō-territories and was a 
prime candidate for further expansion, as it already had the necessary military/naval 
knowledge situated there (as discussed in chapter 1). Later during the Meiji period (in 1886), a 
military naval port was opened in Sasebo, a mere 50 kilometres north of Nagasaki. Sasebo 
would grow out to become one of the major ports of Japan’s imperialistic plans for the Asian 
theatre and was heavily supported by Nagasaki.134 It was among these circumstances that 
Nagasaki rose out to become one of Japan’s major military-industrial complexes. While this 
system was eventually completely carried by Japanese expertise and craftsmanship, its early 
growth depended heavily on importing necessary foreign knowledge. Especially during the 
Bakumatsu-period (1850 – 1860s) was Dutch influence notable. The next paragraph will explore 
the role that various Dutch individuals played in the rise of industry within Nagasaki and its 
surroundings.             
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2.2.  From Dutch expertise to Japanese endeavours  
The influence of the Dutch on Japanese industrialization comes in many variations. Dutch 
knowledge was passed on through spreading various books, through state actors but also 
through individuals who were hired as part of the Japanese government’s own efforts. Dutch 
influence in Japanese industry, construction and engineering (summed up as ‘industry’ 
henceforth) also varied from building small factories, expanding coal mining and overseeing the 
construction of bigger projects like ports. Often this also happened in cooperation with other 
foreign powers like the United Kingdom, where the Dutch played a bridging role between 
Western expertise and contact with the Japanese. Just like with the story of modernizing the 
military in Japan, the story of modernizing the industry in Japan starts decades before the 
opening of Japan. And similar to the modernization of the army, the warlord Nabeshima 
Naomasa plays an important part in the earliest machinations of Japanese Western-style 
industry.  
  As the former chapter examined, Naomasa had big ambitions when it came to the 
military prestige of his domain after the humiliation of the Phaeton incident. But modernizing 
your military does not just mean that importing military knowledge and teaching it to your 
troops and officers is enough. One also needs the necessary military equipment to supply 
troops; guns, ammunition, uniforms, artillery, ships etcetera. To equip a decent sized force one 
requires higher quantities and standardization than individual craftsmen can supply. Proper 
industrial-sized production plants, which can produce large quantities of standard-issue 
equipment, are hence a must for a modern army. And that’s exactly what Naomasa aimed to 
acquire for his domain.135 During Naomasa’s reign various books filled with Western knowledge 
of various topics were already circulating throughout Japan. Most of these were imported 
through Deshima in Nagasaki, as Japan requested many scientific books from the Dutch that 
could be studied within the rangaku movement. One of these books that circulated was the 
fairly new Bijdragen tot het gietwezen in 's rijks ijzer-geschutgieterij te Luik136 (Roughly 
translated Contributions to the iron-casting works in the state’s iron artillery foundry of Liege) 
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which was imported by the Dutch trading vessel Marij en Hillegonda in 1836. The 337-page 
book gives a detailed look into the production of the, by then still relatively modern, iron 
reverberatory furnaces situated in Liege (modern-day Belgium) and also goes into the various 
requirements and processes needed to produce artillery pieces in larger quantities. This book 
included 13 plates and 10 tables to visualize how such a foundry should work and look like.137 
For Naomasa, this was the ideal book to build his initial military industry. The low-ranked Saga 
samurai Sugitani Yosuke (dates unknown), who studied in Edo, had just started the translation 
of this very book while Naomasa started to formulate his plans for ironworks in his domains. 
Sugitani finished the translation in the years after 1836 and delivered it to Naomasa when he 
returned to Saga (the precise year seems to be unknown).138 This book was then successfully 
used to build Japan’s first reverberatory furnace in Saga (completed in late 1850). This furnace 
managed to produce its first 36-pound coastal gun by 1853.139 That a fully functional (even if it 
had some production flaws) foundry could be built with just a translated Dutch book and some 
pictures is a sign of a deep understanding of the Dutch language and its role within Western 
science in Japan. The cannons produced at this site eventually shaped the Nagasaki landscape 
as they were used in arming the coastal defences of the city after the opening of Japan (as 
discussed in the first chapter). 
  But soon after the opening, industrialization also started to take place in the city of 
Nagasaki itself. The industrialization in Nagasaki was first directly linked to the opening of the 
Nagasaki Naval Training Center. In the year 1856 it was decided that Nagasaki needed a 
factory/repair workshop that could service the newly build Japanese naval ships and other 
visiting foreign ships with necessary maintenance. The Japanese government had already 
ordered multiple Dutch-built steam-engines for this purpose from the Dutch navy a year before. 
They also requested that Dutch engineers would install these engines at an appropriate site on 
the northern shore of Nagasaki. While the Dutch navy was no longer renowned as a potent 
force around the world, they seem to have been quite apt at working with steam engines and 
followed the latest development in the UK closely. The Dutch navy was quick in studying new 
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designs, learning from mistakes (especially those made in the UK) and adapt them to their own 
force.140 While the Dutch naval engineers were mostly trained with adapted English knowledge, 
the training seems to have been thorough and diligent. 141 Dutch naval engineers thus seem to 
have had a good grasp of their expertise and were proficient enough to transfer their 
knowledge to the Japanese and build the foundations of modern industry in Japan, even if they 
were not always the latest developments in the field.  
   For the job of installing the steam engine the Dutch naval engineer Hendrik Hardes 
(September 1857 – April 1861 in Japan), who had already proven his worth on various ships and 
locations, was enlisted.142 Hardes was included in the crew of the steamship Japan (later 
renamed to the Kanrin Maru), which was ordered by the Japanese government while 
transferring the Soembing. This was the same ship that also supplied the military personnel that 
would train the Japanese naval personnel at the Nagasaki Naval Training Center (as discussed in 
chapter 1).143 The job that Hardes was enlisted for with Japan’s newly ordered steam engines 
was described as ‘install them, get them up to speed and supervise them through the first 
stages’ (‘op te stellen, aan de gang te brengen en aanvankelijk besturen’).144 He also soon 
learned that the purpose of these steam engines was to build a reparation workshop for new 
steamships and to develop new mines in Nagasaki’s surroundings (will be discussed below). The 
workshop was to be built on the opposite shore of where Deshima was situated, in a little town 
called Akunoura (Jp. 飽の浦町, ‘the red village’). The Dutch also learned from this order that 
the Japanese were especially interested in techniques to fabricate industrial iron (objects).145 
This interest in the techniques of industrial iron casting is no surprise. The need for strong iron 
is a vital part to build most Western-style military equipment and this industrial-sized 
production of iron was vastly different from the techniques that had historically been used for 
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tools and weapons in Japan.146 That Japan had problems with this new way of iron casting also 
becomes clear from Naomasa’s effort in producing the first cast-iron cannon. While the furnace 
opened in 1850, it took them over three years to get the process right to cast their first iron 
cannon.147 The interest in these steam engines, the repair workshop and iron casting fit 
seamlessly in the Japanese need for a modern military. It was exactly these kinds of factories 
and techniques that were used in the production of industrial-grade military equipment and 
other large scale projects. And it was Dutch engineers that were very active in supplying the 
necessary materials and knowledge for this during the 1850s and early 1860s. 
  The first pile for the construction of the factory was driven into the ground on 23 
December 1857 and 6 months later (on the 19th of July 1858) actual construction begun. For the 
construction, Hardes was assisted by two other Dutch military engineers; engineer J.M. van 
Aken (dates unknown) and engineer D. Lasschuit (dates unknown).148 Together with a team of 
Japanese workers they successfully managed to construct the majority of the workshop in a 
little under a year’s time. In May of 1859, the large furnace and the wind machine were also 
done, followed by the steam hammer in July.149 During the construction of the workshop, it 
already managed to prove its worth on multiple occasions. The Kanko Maru, Japan’s first 
steamship, needed multiple repairs during 1858-1859 and also the Russian frigate Askold, that 
had received heavy damage during a storm, was repaired by Hardes’ workshop in 1858.150 The 
final repair workshop, complete with its steam hammer, windmill and furnace was apparently 
an impressive feat that was seen almost nowhere else in Asia if we may believe Dutch 
contemporaries. Dr. Phillip Franz von Siebold (1796 – 1866) also reports in his ‘Open Letters’ 
from his second journey to Japan that:  
“Dit Etablissement ziet in dit jaar zijne voltooijing te gemoet. De inrigting van deze werkplaats 
verdient niet alleen met regt de naam van eenen algemeenen reparatiewinkel voor 
stoomwerktuigen, zij is ook door een stoomhamer, eene smederij, eene ijzer-en kopergieterij en 
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eene draabank ezv. op de nieuwste en meestdoelmatige wijze en zoo volkomen ingericht, dat zij 
voor werktuigkundige arbeiden van ieder aard geschikt is en al spoedig zich als eene instelling 
zal doen kennen, die beoosten de Kaap de goede hoop, behalve die te Soerabaia, zijns gelijke 
niet heeft.”151 
Von Siebold was likely a bit biased with his claim that only in Surabaya, the largest city in the 
Dutch Indies and hosting the largest naval base of the Dutch colonies, another workshop of 
similar significance was found in Asia. Though making an untruthful claim would not have 
gotten him far, as readers from other nations surely would quickly notice if such a claim were 
proven not true. Besides, the workshop by Hardes was one of Japan’s first and finest at the time 
and greatly appreciated by the Japanese authorities for its role it could play in the 
industrialization of Nagasaki’s port. 
  That Hardes’ efforts were greatly appreciated by the Japanese government became 
clear when the Nagasaki Naval Training rather abruptly came to an end in 1859. Most of the 
Dutch military detachment that was teaching in Nagasaki was send home except for a small 
crew; Dr. Pompe van Meerdervoort (1829 – 1908) to continue building his hospital and Hardes 
(with a supplement of supporting stokers and engineers) to continue his work on Nagasaki’s 
industrial site which the Japanese authorities deemed worth continuing.152 Hardes’ contract 
was supposed to end in December 1860 but was even further extended for his great worth to 
the Japanese cause by another four months. A letter from the Japanese government in 
December 1860 even reads that Hardes still has much that he could teach to the Japanese and 
hence they request the extension of his stay.153 The construction of the Nagasaki repair 
workshops was thus perceived as a great success by Japanese authorities. For the city of 
Nagasaki it laid the foundation for an industrial site that would later become the Mitsubishi 
Nagasaki Shipyard (which would grow out from this small workshop and dominate Nagasaki. 
See the edited map 3 at the end of the chapter details of the industrial growth in Nagasaki 
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between 1860 – 1924). Simultaneously, for the Dutch it laid the groundwork for the good 
reputation of other Dutch engineers. Small groups of engineers continued to be employed by 
Japanese government even after Dutch experts in other sectors were already released from 
their services (and often got replaced by either other foreigners or newly trained Japanese 
experts). The Japanese historian Juichi Kusumoto (1918 - ), who specializes in the history of 
Nagasaki, even goes as far as saying: ‘The role of Hardes in the History of modern-shipbuilding 
and industry in Japan cannot be overestimated; it may not be too much to say that the basis of 
the industrial Japan of today was indeed laid by Hardes’ efforts in Tokugawa Japan.’154. The 
successes of Hardes and his team have thus likely contributed to the good reputation and the 
further employment of Dutch engineers in Japan. And both during and after Hardes’ stay in 
Japan many more Dutch engineers came to Japan who managed to leave some kind of legacy.  
  One such example of another engineer/scientist whose influence was felt throughout 
Kyushu was Dr. J.K. van den Broek. He worked in Nagasaki from 1853 till 1857 and during his 
stay was approached various times by retainers of Kyushu-domain daimyo to learn about 
Western industry and engineering.155 As the doctor writes himself:  
‘… De blaaswerktuigen waren voor een ijzer-smeltoven veel te klein. Dit begrepen al zeer 
spoedig de vorsten van Fizen (Saga), Tsikoesen (Chikuzen) en Satsoema. Daarom lieten zij mij 
verzoeken hunne dienaren wel te willen onderrigten. Modellen van hoogvoens, reverbeerovens, 
blaaswerktuigen en dergelijke werden door een’ Japanschen timmer, die in mijne bijzondere 
dienst was, vervaardigd en aan hen uitgereikt. … Naar deze modellen werden die ovens 
opgerigt,…’156. 
The three domains of Saga, Fukuoka (then Chikuzen) and Satsuma were some of the major 
clans in Kyushu, and also influential during the Meiji-era. In the period right after 1854 these 
clans were eager to get their hands on Dutch knowledge that still flowed through Deshima. But 
also in Nagaski proper was Dr. van den Broek’s knowledge indirectly influential. He taught many 
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Japanese interpreters, scientists and engineers, among which also Shinagawa Tobei (dates 
unknown) and Motoki Shōzō (1824 – 1875). Both of these men worked on a Japanese foundry 
in Nagasaki (with mixed success) and later also opened a chemical laboratory in Nagasaki, 
which would produce many necessary chemical compounds that were used in Nagasaki’s 
industry.157 Shozo later also oversaw the construction of Nagasaki’s first iron bridge (named 
Kuroganebashi. Jp. 銕橋) by using the knowledge he learned from Dr. van den Broek.158 The 
efforts of Dr. van den Broek are a good example of Dutch influence on the industrial 
developments in Nagasaki where Dutch knowledge was taught to Japanese specialists who then 
in turn adapted this knowledge to build various projects. Dr. van den Broek is one example but 
there are many more similar instances where Dutch knowledge was adapted to modernize the 
industrial sector in Nagasaki (and beyond).   
  And Hardes and Dr. van den Broek were just some of many others that were employed 
by the Japanese government after the opening of Japan. Some other notable names, but who 
worked primarily outside of Nagasaki were Cornelis J. van Doorn (1837 – 1906. In Japan 
between 1871 – 1880) and George A. Escher (1843 – 1939. Father of the famous artist, 1873 – 
1878 in Japan).159 Both of these civil engineers deserve more words devoted to them, as their 
accomplishments are numerous and noteworthy, but within the limits of this thesis, it suffices 
to mention that they are some prime examples of the civil engineers that continued to work in 
Japan (besides other foreign specialists from primarily the UK, USA, Germany, France and 
Russia) even after the Dutch naval engineers had returned home. An engineer who joined Van 
Doorn and Escher but fits within the limits of this thesis is Johannis de Rijke (1873 – 1903 in 
Japan, who even became Vice-Minster within the Home Ministry of the Japanese government 
and worked as an instructor at the Imperial Engineering College of Japan).160 In the 1880s De 
Rijke was tasked with revitalizing the port of Nagasaki after trade had collapsed in the 1870s 
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and Mitsubishi had just moved into the city (1884). 161 Nagasaki’s bay had always been 
renowned for its ‘natural sheltered and deep bay’, but for the nineteenth century the bay’s 
depth (with centuries of deposition of its river) started to reach its limit. When it came to such 
big water-related projects the Japanese seem to have often turned to either British or Dutch 
engineers. This is in a way not entirely surprising, as the skills of British engineers and their 
proficiency with steam engines was world-famous, but Dutch engineers seem to have also 
enjoyed some renown.   
  The Netherlands has a long history of having to fight nature itself to keep large parts of 
the country from flooding. To combat this the ‘Rijkswaterstaat’ institution was founded in 1798 
and during the reign of King William I (1815 – 1840) many new canals, dykes and other water-
related projects were undertaken. In 1842 the ‘Royal Academy of Civil Engineers’ (predecessor 
of the Technical University of Delft) was founded to further professionalise civil engineering and 
the institution soon grew out as a hub where international knowledge was studied and 
processed. Dutch civil engineers received extensive training and could measure up to their 
colleagues from the USA and the UK.162 In the second half of the nineteenth many Dutch civil 
engineers also travelled to the Dutch East Indies to work on various projects there. Here they 
faced new problems, as the challenging natural conditions in East-Asia were different from the 
conditions in the Netherlands. It was from the Dutch East Indies that Dutch civil engineers also 
found employment in other Asian counties, like China and Japan, combining their expertise 
from home with their experience in Asia to create a new civil engineering tradition.163 
Combining this with the good reputation that Dutch engineers had gained after successful 
projects like Hardes’ factory, it seems that the Japanese still often sought out Dutch engineers 
for various big projects (especially if these projects required water management). Dutch 
engineers can as a result be seen working on projects all the way up till the twentieth century, 
when the use of foreign specialists as a whole declined in Japan. 
  De Rijke’s was one of these civil engineers that found a challenge in Asia. His main 
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challenge as the lead engineer was the deposition of sands by the river that came from the 
mountains, which slowly filled the harbour. He eventually proposed a big, invasive project 
where the seabed was dredged and breakwaters were installed to keep the bay deep enough 
for the most modern of ships (see map 4 at the end of this chapter for a map of Nagasaki’s 
depths).164 The project was completed in 1893 and was a great success. The bay’s depth was 
now sufficient for major shipbuilding activities, which was just in time, as Mitsubishi was 
shifting to become a major producer of warships for the Japanese navy. Japan was eyeing its 
neighbours for potential conquests (starting with China in 1894) and a strong navy was 
necessary for these conquests. As such, the Imperial Japanese Navy was a major investor in the 
development of the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyards.165 This development of the Nagasaki 
shipbuilding sector by the Japanese navy in conjunction with De Rijke’s efforts to ‘revitalize’ 
Nagasaki’s port can thus be seen as further reinforcement of the notion that Dutch efforts in 
Nagasaki’s development were often related to the city gradually becoming a military-industrial 
centre. 
  The last aspect that was important to Nagasaki’s rising industry was the aforementioned 
presence of coal in the vicinity. And also in this aspect the Dutch played a role in the 
development of mining facilities. Just to the south of Nagasaki were two major coal fields on 
small islands, Hashima (better known as Gunkanjima or ‘Battleship Island’ (Jp. 軍艦島)) and 
Takashima. The latter of these coal-rich islands was exploited with the help of foreign 
powers166. Takashima mine was first exploited by the Scottish entrepreneur Thomas B. Glover 
during early 1870 and later by a joint-venture of Dutch and British engineers.167 Again, the Saga 
domain played an important role in the developments made in and around Nagasaki. Naomasa 
already commissioned Dutch navy engineers to survey the Takashima coal mine for him in the 
hopes of gaining an important coal site within his domain to fuel his ambitious industrial 
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projects as early as 1858.168 By the request of Naomasa, Dutch engineers also drew plans and 
wrote suggestions to build a modern Western-style mine to maximize the output of the 
Takashima coalfield.169 The Japanese were even recommended to install the recently acquired 
(Dutch) steam engines in the coal mines, to automize the draining process and greatly increase 
both safety and further increase output.170 It is likely to assume that Naomasa sought out the 
Dutch navy for this job because of their longstanding ties with the Kyushu domains and 
Naomasa (and his retainers) were also acquittanced with the skills of Dutch engineers through 
his study of Western engineering during the 1830s-1850s. He had after all extensively studied 
Dutch(/Western) engineering knowledge to be able to construct the first-ever reverberatory 
furnace within Japan. 
  Eventually, the project was put on hold, probably because of shogunal opposition, and 
not resumed until late 1869 when joint Dutch, British and Japanese ventures started working 
together on the mines. The Dutch NHM had acquired ownership of the Takashima mine in late 
1870 after the Scottish Thomas B. Glover (who had bought the mine early 1870) had gone 
bankrupt. Glover would afterwards act as the overseer of the mine for the NHM with a team of 
Dutch, British and Japanese engineers and surveyors (chapter 3 will go into the details of how 
this joint venture came to be). Much of the foundation of the three main pits of Takashima was 
realized by these Dutch and British civil engineers who had made complicated plans to make it 
a truly modern mine that could supply a lot of Japan’s industries with the coal. Yet the plan was 
never finalized by the European engineers as shortly after the start of the construction the Meiji 
government published the ‘Direction for Mining’ (March 1872). This ‘direction’ ordered that all 
mines were to be nationalized and most foreign employees should be expelled from the 
projects.171 Nonetheless, the (now experienced) Japanese engineers that remained managed to 
completely modernize the Takashima mine following the plans the Dutch and British engineers 
had drafted, eventually making it the first Western-style mine in Japan by the mid-1870s. 
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Mitsubishi later acquired the mine in 1881 and the Takashima mine became Japan’s prime 
supplier of cheap coal during its industrialization efforts, especially in Nagasaki and its 
surroundings.172  
  Ships carrying large amounts of coal soon became a common sight in Nagasaki’s 
harbour, fuelling its fires of industries as the shipyards grew on its northern shore. The 
Takashima coal mine was not completely realized by Dutch engineers alone, but they did play 
an important role in its foundation. From the start were Dutch engineers requested to draw 
plans for the mine and later they worked alongside British engineers in the construction efforts. 
The construction of the mine was also tied to the developments in the city itself, as the steam 
engines in the mine were the same ones that Hardes’ team worked on and the coal from 
Takashima fuelled the fires of the repair workshop in Nagasaki (that had significantly grown by 
the 1870s). Simultaneously was this mine also linked to Naomasa’s ambitions, who (as 
established in chapter 1) extensively relied on Dutch knowledge for his modernization efforts. 
As a result, Dutch engineers can be seen as a leitmotif throughout Nagasaki’s industrialization 
of the nineteenth century. 
As Japan started to modernize and look to the West for knowledge, for Nagasaki it came 
naturally that they would first turn to the Dutch for said knowledge. As a result, the Dutch were 
soon found playing a role in kickstarting various industrial projects in and around Nagasaki, like 
the Hardes’ workshop, or teaching Japanese engineers. Dutch engineers had the expertise to 
construct industrial sites and institutions thanks to a long tradition of naval and civil 
engineering in the Netherlands. In these fields could Dutch engineers compete with foreign 
specialists from other nations. But in other engineering fields (e.g. heavy industry and 
architecture) or outside of Nagasaki the Dutch engineers rarely managed to leave a mark in 
Japan. Because the first Dutch engineers were mostly navy employees, most engineers were 
also released from their services when the Dutch naval detachment was sent home. Only a few 
civil engineers remained after that. Nonetheless, the basis that the Dutch helped to establish in 
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Nagasaki would become the foundation for the later Mitsubishi Shipyards (and related 
institutions) that would dominate Nagasaki in the nineteenth century.    
 
Map 3 Nagasaki bay (1894) with own editing to depict the expansion of its industrial sites. In bright yellow the former bounds of 
Deshima for comparison. Dark blue is Akunoura, the site of Hardes' steam workshop (1858 - 1861). In bright orange are further 
expansions by other companies and later Mitsubishi between 1874 – 1894. With green the growth of Mitsubishi Nagasaki 
Shipyards is depicted during 1894 – 1928 (and closely how it was on the eve of World War 2, based on Nagasaki map 1928 in 
Kjeld Duits Collection). Both 1860 and 1894 maps are courtesy of the University of British Columbia, available at 
https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/tokugawa/items/1.0223031#p0z-5r0f: [22-10-2019]. 
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Map 4 Map of the depths in modern-day Nagasaki Bay. In the map, it is shown that the shallowest part of Nagasaki is now 
roughly 10 meters, while around the shipyards it is around 15 meters deep. Source: Courtesy of Randy Sasaki of the Kyushu 
National Museum. 
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3. The fading of Dutch trade within Nagasaki, 1854 - 1874 
When Commodore Perry and his black ships opened the ports of Japan, it sent a shockwave of 
change through the country. It ushered in a new era with new possibilities and opportunities 
for both the inhabitants of Japan and foreign traders who sought to take advantage of the new 
market. To little surprise, many foreigners from countries that had no access prior to 1854 to 
Japan (e.g. Americans, British, Germans, French and Russians) quickly travelled to Japan to 
access this new huge market once trade treaties were concluded in 1858. But also for the 
Dutch, who already had access to Japan, much changed when it came to trade with Japan. The 
Dutch could now access the Japanese market through other entry points. First through three 
‘Treaty Ports’ (Yokohama, Hakodate and Nagasaki) before opening fully by the 1870s. Whereas 
other foreign powers tried to gain access to Japan through other ports, Dutch trade (especially 
through the NHM, with close ties to the Dutch government) decided to heavily invest into their 
presence in Nagasaki to access the Japanese market through there.   
  This chapter will delve into the ambitions the Dutch had for their trade with Japan after 
1853 and how their presence influenced Nagasaki’s trade sector throughout the second half of 
the nineteenth century. To this end, this chapter will look into the goals the Dutch were trying 
to achieve, the treaties they sought and the resulting actions. This chapter will argue that the 
Dutch, both the government and later the NHM, had ambitions to further develop Nagasaki as 
their port of choice. As a result, Dutch activities started to become increasable more 
interwoven with the Nagasaki trade sector. The Dutch were set on using their centuries-long 
experience in the city to their advantage, even though it was quickly noticeable that Nagasaki 
had structural problems to become a successful trade port city. Simultaneously can this chapter 
be seen as the ‘other side of the coin’ from the second chapter as the decline in trade was also 
linked to the rise of industry in Nagasaki. The second chapter already explored which boons and 
disadvantages Nagasaki had as a port city, of which the most disadvantageous for trade were its 
distance from the centre of power in Japan and the limited access to the hinterlands. Because 
the second chapter already explained these factors this chapter will primarily focus on Dutch 
economic policies regarding Japan and how (Dutch) trade declined in Nagasaki.    
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3.1.  Dutch goals, policies and treaties for trade in Bakumatsu-era Japan 
The coming opening of Japan came in times that the position of the Dutch on the world stage 
was changing. The centuries-old balance of power in Asia had shifted after the Napoleonic 
Wars. Yet there were also new opportunities to be found, as the output of their East-Indies 
colonies had been rising since the 1830s under the so-called ‘cultuurstelsel’. Due to this new 
system the Netherlands had gained a surplus of colonial goods and was seeking for new 
markets to sell these products on.173 With a population of roughly thirty million was Japan, 
logically, an interesting target for these goods, but under the sakoku isolation there was only 
limited access for Dutch traders. Besides the financial opportunities, there was also a matter of 
prestige. For over two centuries the Dutch had enjoyed exclusive access among Western 
powers to the Japanese market. That the prestige issue was important to the Dutch becomes 
apparent when looking at the continuation of trade in Japan while profits were dwindling (even 
becoming negative) throughout the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. In this 
period, the (almost) exclusive access to Japan’s trade goods, culture and nature played an 
important factor in the prestige the Netherlands enjoyed as a (maritime) nation. As the risk of 
Japan getting forcefully opened increased constantly throughout the 1840s/50s, Dutch officials 
became aware that they would have to take the lead in opening Japan. If they would let other 
foreign powers take they lead, it would likely mean the end of their prestigious position and any 
chance of keeping the upper hand in Japan.174  
  The best chance for the Dutch to keep the upper hand was to gain a treaty where other 
nations would have to conform to the same limited trading situation that the Dutch were in. A 
lesser position compared to the Dutch would probably also work, though that would 
undoubtedly not be accepted by other Western nations.175 If other nations would also be 
bound to Nagasaki, like the Dutch, they would have to settle in a setting where the Dutch had 
been a dominant factor for over two centuries. Even if the rest of Japan would open at a later 
date, all nations would start from Nagasaki, which would create more even opportunities. That 
the Dutch government aimed for the plan to settle everybody in Nagasaki becomes clear from 
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the conceptual treaty that Dr. Phillip Franz von Siebold wrote for them in 1852. Siebold’s draft 
contained five articles total and two of these explicit state that trade should be henceforth 
conducted exclusively in Nagasaki. Two other ports would also be opened, but solely for 
provisions (one in the Ryukyus and one on Hokkaido).176 The draft that Siebold submitted to the 
Dutch Ministry of Colonies was very influential for the final result and was expanded by the 
Governor-General in Batavia to six articles. The Governor-General even further emphasized the 
importance of trade in Nagasaki for other nations, but under similar circumstances to the 
Dutch.177 Especially the first sub-articles of article four in the final treaty that was submitted to 
the Japanese in 1852 summarizes the Dutch intend clearly:  
  ‘Art. 4.  
A. De haven van Nagasaki schijnt het geschikst om voor den handel met vreemdelingen te 
worden opengesteld, en, daar de opening van geene andere havens wordt voorgesteld, 
blijft zoodoende de gemeenschap  van vreemde natiën met de overige gedeeltes van 
Japan afgesloten. 
B. Zulk een Opperhoofd is echt niet de eenigen koopman, maar het hoofd der vreemde 
kooplieden. 
C. De Nederlanders hebben Desima tot verblijfplaats; ook voor vreemden zoude, zoo voor 
hunne woningen als voor hunne magazijnen, eene plaats kunnen worden aangewezen. 
D. Daar bij de wetten van Japan het aan de ingezetenen verboden is om regtstreeks handel 
te drijven met vreemde kooplieden, zoo meent Zijne Majesteit, dat het hier aangegeven 
middel groot nut kan hebben.178 
In this article, the Dutch advise that a continuation of the pre-1853 trading situation would be 
most beneficial for ‘all’. The Dutch proposed that the pre-1853 limitations should be used to 
accommodate all the other foreign nations that come to Japan in Nagasaki, complete with their 
own Opperhoofd and confined quarters. In reality this treaty would likely be mostly beneficial 
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to the Dutch. All other nations would also be limited to the relatively limited Nagasaki market, 
where it was hard to spread their influence and where the Dutch competition had centuries of 
experience. 
  This proposal by the Dutch to open the ports of Japan on its own terms was eventually 
politely declined by the Japanese. The Americans arrived a year later to forcefully open them, 
just as the Dutch suggested they would in their proposal of 1852.179 Initially, the treaty that 
Commodore Perry concluded with the Japanese in 1854 did not grant trade privileges but only 
gave access to provisions in some Japanese ports. But what Commodore Perry already 
emphasized in his treaty was that the Americans would not accept access to just the port of 
Nagasaki (as it was out of the way for the USA) and they would not be confined to a small area 
as the Dutch and Chinese had been till this point.180 The treaty from Commodore Perry laid 
important groundwork for the influential ‘Harris Treaty’181 of July 1858, which included many of 
the viewpoints Perry had regarding the opening of multiple ports and the freedom foreign 
traders would require in Japan. Eventually the ‘Harris Treaty’ (and the other ‘Ansei Treaties’182 
with other nations in the same year) opened the three ports of Hakodate, Nagasaki and 
Yokohama (1 July 1859), followed by Osaka and Kobe (1 January 1863, but postponed till 
January 1868) and Niigata and Edo/Tokyo in January 1869.183 The trade treaty that Donker 
Curtius eventually negotiated with the Japanese on the 18th of August 1858 was one of these 
‘Ansei Treaties’.184 By then the Netherlands had failed to be the first to gain a trade treaty with 
Japan and be an example to the rest, as they had aimed to be ever since King William’s II letter 
of 1844. This treaty by Donker Curtius also did not include any of their former plans to isolate 
foreign trade to Nagasaki.185 That the Dutch had to be content with a similar position to the 
other foreign nations in Japan meant that the Dutch had lost its advantageous position. For the 
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Dutch this meant that they now had to find another way to leave their mark in Japan. Chapter 1 
and 2 already discussed how the Dutch aimed to do this with the regards to military and 
industrial developments (and investments). Simultaneously, the Dutch seemingly decided to 
increasingly invest in and develop their Nagasaki trade network. This with the goal to 
incorporate this trade port further into their intra-Asian trade network (as will be explained 
below).  
  Looking at the ‘Ansei Treaties’, open foreign trade did not really start in Japan until the 
opening of the ports of Hakodate, Yokohama and Nagasaki in 1859. Until 1859, trade in 
Nagasaki was still primarily dominated by Chinese and Dutch traders, even though the ports of 
Japan were already opened to some degree.186 Traders from the other nations: Americans, 
British, Russians and French, only entered the scene en masse in 1859 and quickly carved out 
their share of the Nagasaki trade.187 The Dutch plan, to get a superior position compared to the 
others, had already decisively failed by 1859. The Dutch had hoped they could use their long-
standing friendship, the respected position of ‘Dutch’ doctors (like Von Siebold) and their own 
knowledge of Japan, to advance their situation ahead of the competition. As such the 
disappointment in the Netherlands was great when the ‘Harris Treaty’ with the United States 
was concluded. The USA had gotten certain privileges before the Netherlands could negotiate 
them, showing that even though the Netherlands had a ‘Most Favoured Nation’-agreement188 
with the Japanese, they were not granted these privileges first.189 It was clear for the Dutch 
parliament they were only following behind other nations at that point, instead of leading 
them. The Dutch Minister of Colonial Affairs also remarked: ‘… at present, so to speak, the 
Netherlands only follows other powers, especially the United States of North America.’190. 
  By 1859 the Netherlands had thus lost most of its prestigious position and privileges 
compared to the other nations and they were no longer the only ones in Nagasaki. Nor were 
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they all confined like the pre-1853 situation. The situation rapidly changed between 1859 and 
1868. Where around 1859 the Dutch were still the second largest foreign trading group (behind 
the Chinese), a decade later they only came in fourth in numbers. In 1868 there were 375 
Chinese, eighty-one British, thirty-nine Americans, thirty Dutch, fifteen French, eight 
Portuguese and six Swedish residents living in Nagasaki.191 While the Chinese were the most 
numerous, their position was a bit ambiguous within Japan. The resulting situation of the 
Opium Wars (both First and Second), the lack of formal relations between China and Japan and 
the disassembling of the Chinese quarters created a vacuum within the position of Chinese 
traders in Japan. They could still work in Japan, but had no legal representation nor could they 
claim privileges that the Western nations had acquired. As such most of these Chinese residents 
ended up working for newly arrived Western traders, who gladly used their knowledge of trade 
in Japan to get ahead of the competition.192 Their wavering position becomes even more clear 
from a letter which F.G Myburgh (British consul in Yokohama) wrote to R. Alcock (the 
diplomatic representative of Britain in Japan). In this letter, he writes that many Chinese traders 
even approach Western traders to ‘buy’ an employee position within the Western companies, 
just to get some kind of legal protection in Japan.193 The Chinese trade had been one of the 
pillars on which Nagasaki had prospered and this virtually disappeared within a short period. 
The replacing Western trade was not nearly as advantageous to the Japanese thanks to the 
clauses in the various ‘Ansei-treaties’ that heavily favoured Western traders.  
  Contrary to the position of the Chinese, the Dutch were inferior in number in Nagasaki, 
yet they seem to have had considerable influence. Numerous foreign companies came to 
Nagasaki after 1859, even multiple Dutch ones, but none might have been as big or as 
influential as the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij N.V. was. The NHM was by far the 
biggest company that came to Nagasaki after 1859 and was also one that had strong ties with 
the Dutch government. The NHM is described as ‘the most powerful financial interest at 
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Nagasaki and had invested heavily in Glover and Company’194 throughout the 1860s. While the 
company did not only trade directly in Japan, they seem to have also influenced the Nagasaki 
market by using their large financial capital to finance companies. This made many (foreign) 
companies in Nagasaki dependent on the fate of the NHM in the city.195 Glover’s company is an 
example of such a company and is a name that was also mentioned in chapter 2 as the owner 
of the Takashima mine. Glover was known as a very successful businessman and was a major 
player in the Nagasaki trade sector. But both the stories of the NHM and Glover also have their 
share of failure. Glover’s conglomerate of Nagasaki companies went bankrupt in 1870196 and 
the NHM saw revenues going down rapidly throughout the 1870s (having to close their 
headquarters in Nagasaki in 1874 and completely withdrawing from Japan in 1881)197. These 
dates very much coincide with the 1870 newspaper quote from the introduction, which 
lamented that Nagasaki was no longer the same as before and the outlooks were grim for trade 
and the inhabitants. This likely points to a strong correlation between the failures of Nagasaki’s 
biggest financial power (NHM), one of its biggest entrepreneurs (Glover) and the dwindling 
trade position of Nagasaki within Japan, as will be explained in the next paragraph.  
3.2.  Dutch power looming behind the Nagasaki trade sector 
Now the question is, what happened during the 1860s (and early 1870s) with the trade sector 
in Nagasaki and how was this influenced by the Dutch? Initially, after the ports opened for trade 
in 1859, Nagasaki attracted foreign traders from far and wide. These traders started to heavily 
invest in businesses located on the southern shore of Nagasaki (beside Deshima, and opposite 
of where industrialization efforts were underway) and making these buildings their 
headquarters. By October 1860 the first residents (mostly consuls from various nations) took up 
residence here, after which the area started to attract most of the foreign businesses in 
Nagasaki. On the 15th of April 1861, an edict was even issued by the various foreign consuls, 
proclaiming that all foreign (Western) traders should relocate to this area. This ‘foreign 
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settlement’ became known as the ‘Ōura Bund’ and hosted all foreign traders in Nagasaki from 
1861 onwards (with the exception of Chinese traders).198 For most of the traders that took up 
residence in Nagasaki the main reason seems to have been the direct connection the city had 
with Chinese cities like Shanghai and the rest of East Asia beyond that.199 This reason is fairly 
identical to the reason why Nagasaki was an ideal location for Japan’s rising imperialistic 
ambitions in the second half of the nineteenth century. From Nagasaki it was a fairly 
straightforward journey to reach most other East Asian destinations. But the trading sector in 
Nagasaki also had some inherent problems. Many traders that came to Nagasaki hoped to 
make quick profits with small businesses and very little starting capital. They loaned money 
from bigger companies (like the NHM), then took advantage of the rising market in Nagasaki 
and after which they disappeared as quickly as they appeared again with their profits.200 This is 
naturally not a healthy occurrence for a trading port, as this meant that not only companies did 
not stick around for further business ventures, it also meant that money was rarely finding its 
way into the city. As a result, Nagasaki benefitted relatively little from Western foreign trade, 
even while some Western companies like the NHM and the British Jardine Matheson & Co. 
made considerable revenue there.  
  This brevity of the businesses in Nagasaki also reflects in the numbers. In the period 
between 1865 – 1870 thirteen companies settled in Nagasaki, but by 1871 only two of these 
companies were still in existence.201 So most of these fortune seekers either perished through 
bankruptcy or disappeared with their profits within a few years of their arrival. Most of the 
money they made left the city (or even the country) and citizens of Nagasaki working in the 
trade sector enjoyed little stability. How the citizens of Nagasaki experienced the instability of 
the 1860s is hard to predict and is rarely discussed in Western sources. It would be worth 
looking into if Japanese source materials tell more of their experiences. Looking at the Nagasaki 
newspaper quote, it seems that while the citizens enjoyed little stability regarding trade, the 
1860s were regarded as better times than the 1870s. Unstable job prospects were likely better 
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than no job prospects at all for the inhabitants of Nagasaki.  
  While there were many smaller companies, there were also bigger companies that 
decided to settle in Nagasaki. These companies generally had more long-term plans for the city. 
Examples of the most prominent of these were the Dutch NHM and Scottish entrepreneur 
Thomas Blake Glover (which started small but soon grew big). As their businesses were set to 
be more long-term, they also became more interwoven with the economic situation of 
Nagasaki. As a result, the faith of these companies eventually also became important factors to 
the economic health of the city. The NHM came to Nagasaki in 1859 after sending the Dutch 
trader Albertus Baduin (1829 – 1890) and Dr. Von Siebold to Japan to enquire if Japan would be 
interested in the goods the NHM could supply.202 The Dutch aimed to use the Japanese market 
to sell large quantities of colonial goods; especially coffee and sugar, but also other spices. 
Besides the colonial goods, the Dutch also sought to sell European linen and military supplies. In 
return, they sought payment in rare metals (mostly gold and silver, but also copper). The NHM 
knew though that exporting large quantities of rare metals would eventually cause problems, as 
the Japanese had historically been careful with exports of their rare metals. A solution for this 
was to also invest in a rising new commodity in Japan, namely coal, as the Dutch were looking 
for a supply of the material for its colonies.203 The Dutch assistance in the emergence of the 
coal industry in Nagasaki (as discussed in chapter 2) was thus no coincidence, but rather part of 
larger Dutch plans to attempt to create a new trade commodity within Japan which they could 
trade in their East-Asian network and use themselves in the Dutch East-Indies. 
   The answers from Baduin and Von Siebold were positive for the NHM and the company 
decided to open a permanent office in Japan, settling their headquarters on Deshima204 (which 
was incorporated into the foreign settlement area in 1863). It has to be considered though that 
Von Siebold’s part in the positive response was likely also rather biased and exaggerated the 
interest of the Japanese in Dutch products. Siebold was very eager to return to Japan and 
continue the activities that he was forced to abandon when he was banished in 1828. When he 
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finally returned to Japan he quickly continued with gathering plants for his own business 
ventures, resumed his research and undertook other activities which did not benefit his 
employers at the NHM. Because of the many rumours surrounding conflicts of interest he was 
already let go again by the NHM in 1860.205 Nonetheless, the Dutch choice to further Nagasaki 
as their base of operations seems to have been primarily based on two factors: firstly, to 
continue using the centuries-old system through Deshima and secondly to use Nagasaki 
because of its connection to the rest of Asia.206 While the latter reason is used more often, as 
the city’s direct connection to the rest of East Asia is clear (and mentioned by both other 
foreign traders and for Japan’s imperialistic ambitions), the first reason is most likely a 
continuation of (false) hopes that the Dutch still enjoyed special treatment over other foreign 
traders in Nagasaki. Nonetheless, the answers of Baduin and Siebold meant that the Dutch 
would eventually decide to develop their trade ventures in Nagasaki on the existing Dutch 
networks there, similarly to the development of industry and military from the first chapters. 
  Thomas Glover, on the other hand, could have easily been grouped with the many new 
foreign traders that came to seek fortune in Japan. When he arrived in Japan in September 
1859 he was still a young man at the age of twenty-one, with little capital and knowledge of 
Nagasaki.207 But the main difference between Glover and the majority of fortune seekers in 
Nagasaki is that he managed to create a legacy in the city. His various businesses became 
important aspects of Nagasaki’s trade sector and also got intertwined with NHM interests in 
Japan. Glover already got acquittanced with the Dutch ventures within a few days of his arrival. 
He took up residence in one of the houses on Deshima, close to the headquarters of the NHM, 
and he acquired a Dutch interpreter because the Japanese generally only spoke Dutch as a 
(Western) foreign language.208 He worked two years for the British Jardine Mathenson & Co. 
that set up a branch in Nagasaki (the biggest British company in Nagasaki). Jardine was one of 
the various British companies (others were smaller, like Walsh & Co. and Bent & Co.) that 
dominated the Nagasaki trade sector between ca.1858 – 1863 using their strong position after 
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the Opium Wars to peddle products between Nagasaki and China. These companies already 
made small (illegal) forays into the Nagasaki market before the ‘Ansei Treaties’ were concluded. 
By 1859, when the NHM arrived, these companies had already established their share of the 
trade in the city and were direct competitors to the NHM. By the early 1860s the NHM, with its 
much larger financial capital, had overtaken most of these British companies in market share.209 
The ambitious Glover eventually left Jardine to found his own branch office of Jardine in 
Nagasaki. 
   Glover founded the “Glover & Co.” company together with Francis Groom (Dates 
unknown) and started to trade in tea, which was Nagasaki’s prime export product at the time. 
But Glover later also expanded to other Nagasaki products like silk, seafood and coal (from the 
Takashima and Hashima mines as discussed in chapter 2). Glover quickly gained renown and his 
various business ventures played an important role on the Nagasaki trade market. While he did 
earn considerable funds himself, most of these ventures were realized with large sums of 
money he loaned from the NHM and the Jardine main office.210 Glover also acquired the mining 
rights to the Takashima Mine from the Saga domain in 1869, as he had witnessed the rising 
profits of the coal sales in Nagasaki during the 1860s. The Takashima mine was already 
supplying Japan with cheap coal, but now industry in Nagasaki was growing, he thought that 
purchasing the coal mine would be a smart investment.211 The purchase of this mine would 
eventually have big effects for Glover, the NHM and also Nagasaki (as will be discussed below). 
  Besides these legal businesses, Glover had also earned large sums of money with a very 
risky business during the 1860s. Noting the growing dissatisfaction among the Kyushu and 
Southern Honshu clans, Glover decided to sell military equipment to the would-be rebels of the 
Meiji Restoration of 1868. He learned of their growing discontent from incidents concerning the 
Chōshū clan212, the Satsuma clan213 and other clans in (Southern) Japan. As shrewd as Glover 
was, he noticed the brewing storm and decided to supply these rebelling clans with military 
 
209 Lane, The Foreign Settlement, 485. 
210 Burke-Gaffney, Holme, Ringer & Company, 14 – 17. 
211 McMaster, ‘The Takashima Mine’, 220 – 221. 
212 The Shimonoseki campaign of 1863, involving fights between Western forces and the Chōshū clan, 
213 The Anglo-Satsuma War of 1863, where British forces bombarded the Satsuma clan capital. 
69 
 
equipment, which he acquired from various sources, among them the NHM.214  But Glover was 
not the only one. Some of the most important clients of the NHM were the samurai classes, 
both on the Tokugawa side and on the (growing) pro-imperial side.215 During the 1860s both 
sides purchased large quantities of military equipment and steamships (both the shogunate as 
the Satsuma bought steamships) from the NHM. The profits from the military equipment sales 
that the NHM and Glover ran through Nagasaki were high, giving them the opportunity to 
reinvest the profits in other aspects of their Japanese ventures.216 The NHM used these profits 
to open new offices in Yokohama (1964), Kobe/Osaka (1968) and Tokyo (1869217), but mostly 
lend money to other businesses.218 Glover used his profits, together with new loans, to invest in 
the Takashima coal mine and other Nagasaki-based businesses.219 Both the NHM and Glover 
thus profited greatly from the rising tensions before the Meiji Restoration and they used these 
profits to invest in new business ventures (both of other companies as in their own) in 
Nagasaki. 
But neither of Glover nor the NHM seem to have anticipated the effects the instability of the 
early Meiji Restoration would have for their businesses in Nagasaki. Most direct and obvious of 
these major changes was the sudden disappearance of the revenues from the military 
equipment sales.220 With the Meiji Restoration won by the Satchō-alliance and the Emperor 
restored there was no need for large quantities of weapons. Especially also since Japan started 
to get its own (military) industries running in the late 1860s (see chapter 1 and 2). This change 
removed a large part of the revenues that both these companies could have otherwise invested 
in their Nagasaki businesses, or even stay profitable. But there were other changes after 1868 
that also played a vital role in the eventual disappearance of these two major companies from 
Nagasaki.  
  Glover was as entrepreneur always searching for new business ventures (and for more 
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money to finance these). One of his primary investors for his various ventures was the NHM, 
which was the main financial power in Nagasaki and which profited greatly from the interest on 
its loans to other businesses (with interests going as high as fifteen to eighteen per cent).221 The 
business historian Shinya Sugiyama (1949 - ) noted that during the 1860s the NHM invested an 
amount of 460.000 dollars into Glover & Co. (with inflation translates to roughly 11.7 million 
dollars (2019)). This equalled more than a whole year’s profit that the NHM made in Japan 
during the 1860s.222  So while these companies were both competitors in Nagasaki, they were 
also highly dependent on each other. Glover constantly came up with new business ventures in 
Nagasaki, and the NHM often supplied him with the necessary funds.  After which the NHM 
earned more money because of the high-interest rate. Of course, neither party was exclusively 
dealing with each other, because Glover also loaned large sums from his old employer Jardine 
among others. But Glover and the NHM were also often business partners in some form or 
another. This circle of new ventures, new investment and again new ventures continued during 
the whole of the 1860s and played an important role in keeping the trade sector alive in 
Nagasaki with flowing capital. Glover’s companies and the NHM were important to many 
inhabitants of Nagasaki as the city was in the 1860s still very much orientated on foreign trade 
and their business ventures created a steady supply of jobs. Yet this all changed in 1869 when 
Glover purchased the Takashima mine. 
  Glover had completely overestimated the purchase of the Takashima mine from the 
Saga domain. Glover seemingly had hoped that with the increasing sales of coal in Nagasaki 
(and beyond) he could easily pay off the 70.000 dollars it had cost him (it was all the capital he 
had left supplemented with loans from the NHM and Jardine). But the promised profits did not 
come quickly enough. Before he had a chance to earn his money back, various creditors (in 
Japan and from abroad) approached him to demand repayment of outstanding loans. Glover 
did not have this money and soon struggled to pay off his debts to the NHM, Jardine and the 
various others.223 Glover desperately tried to acquire new loans to pay off his currents debts, 
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but after long consideration, both the Jardine company and the NHM deemed that liquidation 
of all his assets was the only option. Glover & Co. was declared bankrupt on 22nd of August 
1870.224 As the largest creditor of Glover & Co., the NHM became the trustee of the company 
and took over its assets. The NHM liquidized many assets in Nagasaki (except for the Takashima 
mine) to pay off the remaining debts to Jardine and others.225 Glover subsequently offered his 
services to pay back all his debts by overseeing the Takashima mine for the NHM. This shows 
that he was still eternally optimistic that his purchase of the mine was the right one. His 
optimism also shows from the following quote from Glover’s liquidation meeting with his 
creditors: “… that at the public meeting held at the Consulate [on the 16th], T.B. Glover, 
enthusiastic to the last, has voluntarily offered his services gratis to superintend the practical 
working of the mine, he himself has thus apparently small doubt of ultimate success.”226 But 
even with his undying enthusiasm, with Glover & Co. bankrupt, the truth is that Nagasaki had 
lost one of its biggest businesses. One which had supplied many a Nagasaki citizen with jobs 
during the 1860s as the NHM could not keep these businesses running. The resulting closure of 
many business ventures (and the jobs these brought) likely contributed heavily to the 
increasing feeling of despair that was growing in the Nagasaki trade sector by the 1870s.    
  But for a while it seemed like Glover had been right all along about the Takashima 
mine’s potential. The sales from the mine soon started generating considerable revenue, 
offsetting the dwindling revenue from other sectors in Japan for the NHM. In the years directly 
after the Meiji Restoration, various Western businesses were forced to close. New laws and 
demands during the Meiji period made it harder for Western businesses to operate as they did 
before.227 But thanks to the mine, the NHM managed to offset not only the losses in other 
sectors of trade, but it also offset the debt from the bankruptcy of Glover & Co. and debts from 
other companies that went bankrupt and were henceforth impossible to collect.228 Within two 
years’ time, the Takashima mine had generated over 300.000 dollars, three-quarters of what 
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the NHM invested in Glover & Co. during the whole 1860s.229 The Takashima mine, that was 
already developed with the help of Dutch surveyors throughout the 1850s and 60s, not only 
supported the rising industry in Nagasaki (which was developed on foundations laid by the 
Dutch in the 1850s), it also kept the NHM afloat in Nagasaki during the turbulent years directly 
after the Meiji Restoration. The NHM also gratefully noted in their annual report of 1873 - 1874 
that the sales and commission on their coal mining business in Nagasaki was one of their most 
profitable ventures in Japan and played a large role in keeping the company profitable between 
1870 and 1874.230 The sales of the coal from the mine was thus an important factor in the NHM 
staying profitable during the dwindling trade during the late 1860s and 1870s. Without this 
source of income would the NHM not have been able to generate enough revenue to continue 
operating in Japan. To an extent, the fate of the NHM was now tied to the existence of the mine 
while the financial capital of the NHM was tied to many businesses within Nagasaki.  
  Yet this construction could not endure long for the NHM, as the new Japanese Meiji 
government had larger ambitions (setting their eyes on imperialist ambitions in Asia). To that 
end started they nationalized all natural resources in the country to ensure they had full control 
of their own resources. The ‘Direction for Mining’ came into existence in 1872 and soon after 
the Japanese government bought the Takashima mine from the NHM (the sale was completed 
end of November 1874). The Japanese government paid 400.000 dollars for the mine, which 
the NHM demanded for the sale to offset the remainder of the debts it had acquired when 
taking on Glover’s debts.231 While the NHM headquarters in Amsterdam were satisfied with the 
profits from the sale, the NHM agent in Yokohama quickly noted that this number was small 
compared to the revenue the mine could have potentially generated for the company.232 The 
loss of this important source of income for the company became quickly apparent. In the year 
of 1873 – 1874 the NHM still made some profits (over 100.000 dollars yearly), but each year 
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afterwards the company incurred negative numbers (going as low as -250.000 dollars in 1875-
1876).233 The reason for these diminishing results of the NHM seems to have been mostly a 
structural one. In a letter by the Chief Agent of the NHM in 1875/76 he describes that the NHM 
failed to generate revenue because of five reasons; outstanding loans they failed to recover, 
insufficient working capital from the Netherlands, loss of Dutch prestige over the years, lack of 
direct connections with Europe and restricted connections with other foreign trading houses.234 
The NHM Board of Directors also apparently refused to invest in new sectors (like tea and 
petroleum) after the profitable trade in military supplies disappeared after the Meiji 
Restoration. 235 After the Meiji Restoration the new Japanese government seems to have 
decided to order new large warships from other sources, like the United Kingdom, which could 
handle larger (and more modern) orders than the Netherlands. Japan could also build its own 
smaller warships now, which the Netherlands mostly supplied, as industry had started to rise in 
the country (as seen in chapter 2). The NHM thus failed through a combination of structural 
problems, failure to adapt to the changing market and the Netherlands losing ground to other 
foreign powers by the 1870s.  
  With the disappearance of one of its biggest business partners (Glover & Co.), the 
profitable Takashima mine and general dwindling trade profits, there was not much left for the 
NHM in Nagasaki. Because of this, the NHM, the biggest financial power in Nagasaki, decided to 
leave the city in 1874 and move its headquarters to Yokohama. But for the NHM this move was 
too little and too late, the numbers stayed in the red and the NHM completely left Japan in 
1881 because it was deemed unprofitable to continue.236 With the removal of the NHM the 
outlook for various Nagasaki trading businesses changed dramatically. Without the NHM there 
was a power vacuum within Nagasaki. For the citizens in the town, of which many lived (direct 
or indirectly) from the foreign presence in the city, the downfall was complete as most Western 
businesses and the biggest investor for new companies had left by the mid-1870s. With the 
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foreign trading sector almost completely disappeared, many citizens in Nagasaki were 
ultimately forced to seek employment in the rising industrial sector in the city. 
  In the end, the NHM was not the sole reason that Nagasaki failed as a trading port city. 
The Nagasaki trade sector was plagued with various, more structural problems as the first part 
of this chapter discussed. Most prominent of these problems was that Nagasaki was too far 
away from the majority of the Japanese market (e.g. Edo/Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka). Nagasaki 
was mostly ideal for traders that sought to connect Japan with the East-Asian markets, which 
attracted many Western foreigners (mainly British and Dutch traders) with strong ties to China 
and the East-Indies. The NHM was among these ventures that sought out Nagasaki for its 
connection with East-Asia but mostly started to influence the Nagasaki trading sector by 
financing many of these businesses with short-term loans. Because of this business model 
started NHM to become increasingly interwoven with the economic health of the city.  
  Yet when by the late 1860s the situation of foreign trade started to become less 
profitable for companies in Japan it started to reflect on both the situation of the NHM and 
Nagasaki. The profits of the NHM dwindled because they failed to adapt to the new situation of 
the post-Meiji Restoration. Simultaneously, the city suffered under the worsening situation of 
the NHM and related companies (like Glover and Co.). At the turn of the 1880s, there was 
barely anything left of the famous foreign trade that had characterized Nagasaki for over two 
centuries and the citizens were desperate for a breath of fresh air. Ironically for Nagasaki, this 
‘fresh air’ came in the form of the polluting heavy industries of Mitsubishi that took over the 
Nagasaki Shipyards in 1884. Yet their arrival was a welcome one for the citizens of Nagasaki as 
they could supply them with what they needed most: a stable source of employment. Nagasaki 
could prosper again, even though it was in a different sector than they had traditionally found 
employment in. 
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Conclusion 
“We struggle against the thought that our power is no more in Nagasaki, we try to fancy that a 
better time is coming, but as no signs of that better time show themselves, we cannot help 
anticipating the final result.” 
  It was these words from the Nagasaki Press in the spring of 1870 that introduced the 
situation that this thesis examined. These words cited above are filled with a sense of 
lamentation and melancholy, which was apparently deeply felt among the citizens of Nagasaki 
at that time. Foreign trade had been struggling all over Japan ever since the Meiji Restoration 
that happened two years prior to the article. Foreign businesses were forced to close as they 
saw their profits dwindling and perhaps nowhere in Japan was this felt as dire as in Nagasaki. 
Foreign trade had been one of the pillars on which the city had thrived ever since its foundation 
in the sixteenth century. Ever since its earliest days, many foreigners had come and gone to try 
their luck in the Nagasaki trading sector. Access to Nagasaki was very limited and as a result, 
also very prestigious. This city was the place to be if one wanted exotic goods that were nearly 
impossible to get elsewhere, both for Japanese and foreign traders in town. Yet this all changed 
with the coming of Commodore Perry in 1853. Commodore Perry succeeded in which many 
before him had failed to do, he managed to forcefully negotiate access to Japanese ports. Soon 
many Western nations jumped on the opportunity to negotiate their own terms of access to 
Japan, which are nowadays known as the ‘Ansei Treaties’ of 1858. Starting from 1859, eager 
foreign traders swarmed Japan to explore new opportunities.  
  It was this changing situation that inspired the central question of this thesis. 
Throughout this thesis the question: ‘To what extent did the Dutch influence shape the 
development of Nagasaki after the opening of Japan in 1854?’ stood central. I have sought to 
answer this question by looking at the influence of the Dutch presence in Japan on 
developments in the military, the industrial and the trade sectors of Nagasaki in the nineteenth 
century. The resulting answers not only shows that the Dutch presence in Nagasaki heavily 
influenced the developments in the three sectors in the city, but also that these influences in 
the sectors were interwoven with each other. As a result, influences in one sector either 
stimulated or hindered developments in the others. How these influences were interwoven 
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becomes clear when you frame these developments on a larger scale with each other. This 
framing all starts with the new situation after 1853, which meant a decline for what can be 
called the ‘old order’; the Tokugawa shogunate, the Chinese and the Dutch. The decline of the 
Tokugawa during the Bakumatsu era is probably the most famous. The Tokugawa shogunate 
already struggled for many years prior to the arrival of Commodore Perry, but eventually failed 
to keep control of the country during the Bakumatsu period. Discontent grew slowly among the 
various clans in Japan, especially over the privileged treatment of foreigners, until it was a 
powder keg waiting to explode. The explosion came in the form of the Meiji Restoration, where 
mostly southern Japanese clans rose up in rebellion and forced the shogunate to give up power.  
  But also for the Chinese and Dutch things drastically changed now that they had lost 
their monopoly. For the Chinese things mostly changed in the form of their changed position 
within Japan. After the Opium Wars had Chinese traders to be content with new positions, 
often operating as middlemen between the Japanese market and Western companies. In this 
position, they were still able to use their trade knowledge of the East Asian trade, while 
simultaneously gaining a small form of legal protection. With the Chinese quarters in Nagasaki 
dismantled (officially in 1859) and Chinese traders often becoming middlemen, Nagasaki had 
lost one of its pillars of foreign trade. For the Dutch, things did not look much better. The reality 
that it was very likely that the Netherlands was set to lose its trade monopoly on Japan was 
already growing among Dutch government officials throughout the nineteenth century. 
Nonetheless, the Dutch still desperately tried to stay ahead of the competition in the new era 
for Japan. The Dutch planned to protect their own monopoly on the Japanese trade by lifting 
the status of Nagasaki to become the main trade city of Japan. The Dutch knew they could not 
protect their monopoly by force, so their only hope was to acquire a deal where the 
Netherlands could still fulfil a prominent position in Japan. As the Japanese government 
declined the Dutch proposals, the Dutch were forced to find another way to gain an advantage 
in Japan. This led to the Dutch assisting the Japanese in the development of military and 
industrial knowledge while simultaneously promoting their trade.   
  When it came to acquiring trade opportunities the Dutch government seems to have 
been hesitant. Diplomatically the Dutch struggled to keep up with the other nations, especially 
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with the USA. Even though the Dutch had centuries-long trade relations, it took the 
Netherlands four full years to negotiate a new trade treaty (a full month after the Americans 
and only one day before the Russians did). The NHM, one of the largest Dutch companies at the 
time and one of the largest trade powers in Asia, did not establish a headquarters in Nagasaki 
(or Japan at all) until 1859. The characteristics of trade in Nagasaki and the instability of the 
Bakumatsu era provided the NHM with many business opportunities they could take advantage 
of. The NHM shaped the Nagasaki trading sector by supplying various business ventures with 
starting capital (in the form of high-interest loans) that they desperately needed. With their 
trade in colonial goods from the Dutch East Indies, selling military supplies to Japan and 
collecting interest they could keep investing in new businesses in Nagasaki, after which they 
collected more interest. The NHM (as the biggest financial power in Nagasaki) created a circle 
of short-term businesses and loans in and around Nagasaki with their business policy. While 
this situation was profitable to foreign businesses, it did not leave much for the citizens that 
had to deal with unstable companies that employed them and profits that only in small margins 
found their way into the city itself. 
  This circle could not last though as it was very sensitive to changes on the market and 
the economic stability of Japan. During the 1860s profits from trade in Nagasaki started to 
dwindle. Businesses in Nagasaki started to gradually go bankrupt or move to Yokohama and 
other cities, decreasing the pay-outs the NHM got on its investments (including debts they 
could not collect from their respective debtors). Almost simultaneously, the end of the Meiji 
Restoration caused an end to the profitable sales in military supplies. Yet the NHM could persist 
for a while in Nagasaki because the bankruptcy of Glover & Co., one of the biggest business 
entrepreneurs in Nagasaki, handed them the Takashima coal mine. The NHM managed to offset 
otherwise negative numbers with the sales from this coal mine and survive longer in Nagasaki 
than was likely viable. But also this venture was short-lived as the NHM lost their rights to the 
mine when the Meiji government nationalized all natural resources in the country.  
  By the early 1870s, Nagasaki had lost the majority of foreign trade in the city (among 
them Glover & Co.) and the biggest financial power in town (the NHM). At this point, no one 
could blame the citizens of Nagasaki for having a negative outlook on the future of their 
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beloved city. Yet the disappearance of foreign trade from the city was not the end for Nagasaki. 
When the Dutch had failed to take the lead in opening Japan they had become determined to 
show the Japanese that they were still the obvious choice to guide them into the new era. 
Specifically by showing the Japanese government that they could help Japan became a modern 
Western-style nation. The effects of this determination was mostly felt in and around Nagasaki, 
where the centuries-old connections of the Dutch ran deep. As the centre of Dutch influence in 
Japan was situated in Nagasaki, the city became a hotspot for Japan’s early military and 
industrial modernization efforts. Dutch officers trained Japanese sailors, officers and engineers, 
supplied them with new military vessels and build the necessary industries to support these 
efforts. These military materials and the related knowledge might not have always been the 
latest in the world (especially compared to the British and the USA), for the Japanese this was 
an important basis on which they could later adapt and develop more modern knowledge from 
other nations.       
  The transformation of Nagasaki from an international trade port to one of the biggest 
military-industrial complexes in Japan (and beyond) was the result of various factors. Some of 
these factors were found in its geographic location, like the vicinity of natural resources and its 
direct connection to the rest of Asia. But other factors were very much the result of policies and 
goals. Japan was looking for a way to catch up with the Western nations and required the 
necessary knowledge to fulfil these ambitions. The Dutch, on the other hand, were desperately 
trying to try to retain their position in Japan and were eagerly offering this knowledge. Nagasaki 
was the logical location for these exchanges and it shaped the future of the city. Even after 
most of the Dutch initiatives had left Nagasaki during the 1850s – 1870s, their legacy persisted 
in the role they played in the early developments in various sectors of the city. Dutch officers, 
doctors and engineers had acted as an important bridge in transferring Western knowledge to 
Japan. Sometimes they transferred (Dutch) knowledge directly to the Japanese and other times 
they acted as important middlemen between the Japanese and the experts of other nations 
(like the joint ventures in mine building, steam engines and civil engineering projects). 
  David Palmer showed in his ‘Nagasaki Districts’, how the contact with the West in 
Nagasaki shaped the social geographical landscape of the city. In his article, he created a 
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narrative for the city by looking through outside influences on the city. He did this by 
highlighting each neighbourhood and how these evolved under contact with the West. This 
thesis took a similar approach to its methodology but adapted it by highlighting three sectors in 
the city instead of looking at neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, just like Palmer’s article, this thesis 
also aimed to connect the wider correlation between the influence of Westerners and the 
wider developments in the landscape of the Nagasaki in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. This thesis ended up as an effort to create an integrated history, combining the 
historical writing of different sectors in Nagasaki (industry, military and trade) with historical 
writings of larger developments in the world (like the position of the Netherlands in Japan and 
also in the world, or the ambitions of Japan post-1853).  
  This was done with the aim to create a more inclusive historical narrative where small 
scale developments are framed within larger developments but also to challenge the common 
misconception that the Dutch influence on Japan ended when Commodore Perry forcefully 
opened the ports of Japan. The influence of the Dutch is just one example, but there were many 
continuities in various sectors of Japan before and after 1853. Yet in literature the year 1853 
seems to be regarded as a completely different era from the centuries before. While this is true 
to a degree, to really understand the events of the post-1853 era it is important to also examine 
the decades before.  For the Dutch case in Japan, the misconception of the abrupt ending of the 
Dutch influence is already evident just from the sheer amount of books that end in 1853. When 
it comes to the period after 1853 there is a lot less written about Japanese-Dutch relations. This 
while many old institutions persisted and various new projects were developed upon the old 
Dutch networks in Japan. Most research that focuses on the Dutch and Japan after 1853 
generally only focus on one aspect of the interactions; e.g. the founding of the navy, building of 
factories, diplomacy or trade. These papers generally are very thorough and detailed, but 
simultaneously rarely connect these with wider developments in Japan and the world. While 
the Dutch quickly lost ground to the specialists of other Western counties, as they were either 
more numerous or better equipped, they still managed to leave a legacy in various sectors in 
Japan. This happened mostly by creating the foundation for various sectors and projects, which 
were later in the nineteenth and twentieth century expanded further upon (either by specialists 
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from other nations, like the UK and USA or by Japanese specialists). 
  This thesis connected the developments in three sectors in Nagasaki to create a wider 
narrative for the city. Performing research this way could also be done for other cities in Japan, 
or other cities (or even countries) around the world, to create a more comprehensive narrative. 
Looking at Nagasaki, just researching the individual activities of the Dutch makes it seem like 
these are just isolated actions and developments. But when these developments are placed in a 
larger picture, it becomes clear that the various (relatively small) Dutch activities played a role 
in shaping the future of Nagasaki and was the result of larger ambitions by both the Japanese 
and the Dutch. Even if the outcomes might have not always been intentional. If Nagasaki’s 
future as military-industrial complex would have had looked much differently without the 
Dutch influence is hard to say. All we can conclude now is that Nagasaki did become a thriving 
military-industrial complex dominated by the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard by the twentieth 
century, building many ships for the Imperial Japanese Navy and becoming (in)famous in 
history. All of which can be traced back to a small steam-powered workshop in a relatively small 
port city which was famous for its foreign trade. 
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